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Euroopan Unioni on toiminut aktiivisesti rikosoikeuden alalla jo vuosikymmenien ajan. Etenkin 
valitusta lähestymistavasta, vastavuoroisesta tunnustamisesta, on tullut tärkeä periaate, joka johtaa 
edistystä harmonisaation sijaan. Vastavuoroisen tunnustamisen valinta ei aina ollut selkeää, ja muita 
lähestymistapoja ehdotettiin. Jäsenvaltioiden odotetaan työskentelevän yhdessä vastavuoroisen 
tunnustamisen kautta oikeusjärjestelmien eroista huolimatta. Jotta vastavuoroinen tunnustaminen 
toimisi, jäsenvaltioilta odotetaan korkeaa keskinäistä luottamusta. 
 
Yksi onnistuneimmista vastavuoroisen tunnustamisen välineistä rikosasioissa on ollut puitepäätös 
eurooppalaisesta pidätysmääräyksestä. Tätä lainsäädäntövälinettä käytetään, jotta saadaan 
täytäntöönpaneva jäsenvaltio luovuttamaan etsitty henkilö määräyksen antaneeseen jäsenvaltioon. 
Pääasiassa jäsenvaltioiden odotetaan noudattavan keskinäiseen luottamukseen perustuvaa 
vastavuoroisen tunnustamisen periaatetta, mutta eurooppalaisen pidätysmääräyksen 
täytäntöönpanon epäämiselle on joitain perusteita. 
 
Erityisesti viime aikoina on noussut esiin kysymyksiä perusoikeuksista ja eurooppalaisesta 
pidätysmääräyksestä. Tuomioistuin keskusteli aiemmin enemmän eurooppalaisen 
pidätysmääräyksen täytäntöönpanosta sen tehokkuuden varmistamiseksi, mutta se on nyt 
omaksunut perusoikeuksia suojelevan asenteen. Tuomioistuin voisi yhä olla aktiivisempi 
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puolustamaan perusoikeuksien suojaamista. 
 
Tämän opinnäytetyön tarkoituksena on vastata kysymykseen: pystyykö eurooppalainen 
pidätysmääräys säilyttämään tehokkuutensa keskinäiseen luottamukseen perustuvan vastavuoroisen 
tunnustamisen tehokkaan soveltamisen ja perusoikeuksien suojaamisen kysymyksissä. 
Tuomioistuimen on täytynyt sovittaa yhteen eurooppalaisen pidätysmääräyksen luonne ja 
perusoikeudet, mutta onko se onnistunut? 
 
Asiasanat: tasapaino eurooppalaisen pidätysmääräyksen perusoikeuksien ja tehokkuuden välillä, 
eurooppalainen pidätysmääräys, eurooppalainen rikosoikeudellinen yhteistyö, vastavuoroinen 
tunnustaminen, vastavuoroinen luottamus 
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The European Union has been actively acting in the field of criminal law for decades now. 
Especially the chosen approach of mutual recognition has become an important principle leading 
the progress instead of harmonisation. The choice of mutual recognition was not always clear and 
other approaches were suggested. It is through mutual recognition Member States are expected to 
work together despite the differences in legal systems. For mutual recognition to work, a high level 
of mutual trust is expected of the Member States. 
 
One of the most successful tools of mutual recognition in criminal matters has been framework 
decision on the European Arrest Warrant. This legislative tool is used in order for the executing 
Member State to relinguish a sough after person to the issuing Member State. Mainly Member 
States are expected to follow the principle of mutual recognition based on mutual trust, but there are 
some grounds for refusal to execute the EAW. 
 
There have been, in recent times especially, issues with fundamental rights and the EAW. If the 
Court was before more about enforcing the EAW in order to assure its effectiveness, it has now 
taken a more fundamental-rights-friendly stance. Although even in this aspect the Court could have 
been more active in advocating the protection of fundamental rights. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to answer the question: Is European Arrest Warrant able to hold its 
v 
effectiveness in issues concerning effective application of mutual recognition based on mutual trust 
and the protection of fundamental rights. The Court has had to reconcile between the natures of the 
EAW and fundamental rights, but has it been successful? 
 
Subject matters: balance between fundamental rights and effectiveness of the EAW, European arrest 
warrant, European criminal cooperation, mutual recognition, mutual trust 
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1 
1. Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
 
The subject of this thesis, broadly, is the principle of mutual recognition and the European Arrest 
Warrant in EU cooperation in criminal matters, and how effective execution of the EAW can cause 
friction between it and fundamental rights. The reason for delving into this topic is that during the 
last decades the principle of mutual recognition has gained more momentum in the EU legal order 
and in the Member States´ own legal orders – especially so during the last 15 years. The EAW is a 
notable framework decision embodying the principle of mutual recognition.   
 
The principle of mutual recognition has had it´s beginning in the EU internal market area where it 
embodied itself in the case of Cassis de Dijon, a case in which the Court stated that: ‖there is no 
valid reason why, provided that they have been lawfully provided and marketed in one of the 
Member States, alcoholic beverages should not be introduced into any other Member State.‖1 More 
recently the principle of mutual recognition has been pervading the area of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters. Within the European agenda the area of freedom, security and justice is a project 
of highest concern and judicial cooperation in criminal matters relates to it closely. 
 
As criminal law has traditionally been closely connected to the sovereignty of the state, and could 
also be considered one the basic elements of a sovereign state, there has been complications along 
the way of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition assumes possibility of cooperation even if the 
criminal legal systems of the Member States are dissimilar.
2
 
 
Transferring mutual recognition to the field of criminal law was a revolutionary and new approach, 
although having been used effectively for a long time in the internal market, because criminal law 
deals with such issues as deprivation of liberty, contrary to how mutual recognition functions in the 
internal market.
3
 It was in 1997, with the Treaty of Amsterdam, that the remarkable aim of molding 
the Union into an area of  security, justice and freedom came to being. After this, in 1998, the 
European Council saw the necessity to better the nations legal systems´ ability to work more closely 
together and set forth a question to Council in which the scope for greater mutual recognition of 
                                                 
1 
Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG (Cassis de Dijon), para 14.
 
2 
Nuotio 2007, 1104.    
 
3 
Herlin-Karnell 2007, 19.
 
2 
judicial decisions was asked to be determined. The Council was then to start a process to integrate 
mutual recognition of decisions and the enforcement of judgements in criminal matters.
4
 In 1999, at 
the European Council meeting in Tampere, taking place at head of government level, the principle 
of mutual recognition was set as a cornerstone of judicial cooperation in criminal matters. The 
reason for this was to avoid harmonisation of criminal law and the need for more effective 
cooperation in criminal matters.
5
 Mutual recognition in practice meant the acceptance of national 
judicial decisions all throughout the Union and that judicial decisions made in one Member State 
are recognised and executed in other Member States just as the decision made in executing State is 
recognised elsewhere. Foreign and domestic judicial decisions are equal.
6
 The basis for mutual 
recognition lies in mutual trust. Member States are thought to be able to accept each others judicial 
decisions because they trust each others criminal systems. 
 
Following the European Council meeting in Tampere many documents concerning policy were 
implemented and within them the foundation of the policy of mutual recognition was clear. Also a 
large number of instruments, which related to the former third pillar, for mutual recognition were 
introduced and adopted. Until the Treaty of Amsterdam the Court had been denied any competence 
in judicial cooperation in criminal matters. For nearly two decades now the Court has repeatedly 
addressed the principle of mutual recognition.
7
 In first such `third pillar´ judgement Gözütok and 
Brügge the Court referred to the mutual trust between member states and to their mutual trust to 
their respective criminal justice systems stating that: ‖each of the should recognise the criminal law 
in force in the other Member States even in the event of a different outcome if it´s own national law 
would be applied.‖ 8  Policy, legislative law and case law having been subjects to constant 
developments lead to a remarkable culmination in the Treaty of Lisbon, in which the position of 
mutual recognition in the EU criminal justice area was firmly cemented to be at the core.
9
 
 
The scope of mutual recognition and which decisions shall be mutually recognised is determined by 
the framework decisions (directives are used now, since Lisbon Treaty came to effect in 2009); for 
legal effect national implementing legislation is required. It is also this implementation that defines 
which national judicial decisions will be encompassed by mutual recognition. Framework decisions 
tend to have a scope and purpose which causes mutual recognition to vary from one framework 
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decision to another.
10
 In this thesis I will go through some of these framework decisions especially 
concentrating on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW.)
11
 
 
It is through framework decisions that mutual recognition was instrumented, when it was launched 
in the context of the former third pillar. Directives are used nowadays with the Lisbon Treaty. The 
goal of these is to approximate the rules on cooperation in criminal matters between the Member 
States. The idea of mutual recognition is to not have to considerably harmonise Member States´ 
criminal law, and as such the Member States can hold on to their sovereignty while still increasing 
the efficiency of their cooperation. As mutual recognition works through predefined framework 
decisions, or today directives, it is not applicable to all judicial decisions arising from the sphere of 
criminal law. 
12
 
 
The EAW is the first and most likely the most important instrument when it comes to enhancing 
judicial cooperation between Member States of the EU in criminal matters that are based upon 
mutual recognition. This has been shown during the 13 years the EAW has been in practice. But at 
the same time it is also one of the most debatable instruments. Many issues have arisen concerning 
its interpretation. This concerns the fragile balance between Fundamental Rights and the 
effectiveness of the EAW in matters of application of mutual recognition that is based on mutual 
trust.
13
 
 
 
1.2 Research question and structure of the thesis 
 
 
This thesis focuses on finding out if mutual recognition based on mutual trust, focusing especially 
on EAW, can be effectively applied in criminal matters. The main research and subject this thesis 
looks to answer is: is European Arrest Warrant able to hold its effectiveness in issues concerning 
effective application of mutual recognition based on mutual trust and the protection of fundamental 
rights? The Court has had to reconcile between the natures of the EAW and fundamental rights, but 
has it been successful? 
 
The object of this thesis is to, by assessing the development and features of the EAW and the 
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4 
principle of mutual recognition, understand how mutual recognition as a foundation of the EAW 
causes friction between fundamental rights. 
 
Raising these questions is important, because there has been a vibrant, ongoing discussion on these 
issues. The Court has had different approach depending on the case, and in the search for balance it 
has had shifts between favoring mutual recognition and fundamental rights. Considering the 
question of whether there is balance to be found or not is vital going forward.  
 
The thesis is divided into five main chapters. First is the introduction. Second chapter will 
concentrate on mutual recognition and its aspects in criminal law. First there will be a brief general 
section of the general concept of mutual recognition within European Union. Next, the chapter will 
dissect mutual recognition and go through its composition. Lastly, there will be an outlook on 
harmonisation and mutual recognition.   
 
Fourth chapter is about the European arrest warrant. First there is an overview on the emergence of 
the European arrest warrant. This part will give insight into how and why the European arrest 
warrant came to be one of flagships of the EU´s immediate legal reaction to the 9/11 events. 
Following this the chapter will delve into the matter of issuing the European arrest warrant. Next, 
the chapter will go through the task of defining crimes in the European Union, concentrating on the 
issue of double criminality. 
 
Fifth chapter will be about the clash between mutual recognition and the protection of fundamental 
rights. The approach in this chapter is done through cases, which give us an idea of the issues with 
mutual recognition, EAW and the fundamental rights. After the fifth chapter there will be a 
conclusion. 
 
 
1.3 Methods and sources 
 
 
The thesis uses different methods of research. In the beginning, the usage of historical method is 
necessary, due to the viewpoint being in the how the EAW came into being. European integration in 
the field of criminal law is in focus. Comparative method is used in order to compare case-law and 
the different views of scholars on the matters. In analyzing basis for mutual recognition and the 
EAW, their features, case-law and evaluation, the analytical method is used. A vast number of 
5 
sources are subject to this analysis. 
 
The scientific literature, articles and monographs, are most valuable sources for the thesis. A 
number of these sources are used throughout the thesis.  
 
Going through legislation, official publications and internet databases, has provided much data. As 
for internet databases, only official ones are used. Depending on the matter not only consolidated 
versions but original ones as well are used. 
 
The Court has had to solve problems that have risen in relation to the EAW and the principle of 
mutual recognition. As such, case-law has been accessed. Mostly the case-law of the Court of 
Justice of the European Union, but also national courts of Member States and the European Court of 
Human Right are referenced. In addition to the judgements of the Court, references of Advocate 
Generals for the rulings are viewed. 
 
Official documents of the EU have provided information. These include European Council, the 
European Parliament, the Council of the European Union and the Commission documents. 
 
Where needed, the law blogs in the internet have been used to supplement information as they often 
offer a vibrant discussion on the cases of the Court. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 
2. Mutual recognition and its aspects in EU criminal law 
 
 
2.1 General concept of mutual recognition within European Union 
 
 
Mutual recognition as a general concept is a topic that has been widely discussed and many papers 
have been published relating to it. This thesis concentrates on the criminal matters, so it is not 
necessary to explore this topic too widely, and because of that only fundamentally relevant issues 
will be studied in this section. 
 
The principle of mutual recognition, which was mentioned in the Treaty of Rome, was more 
developed by the Court of Justice of the European Union in the case of Cassis de Dijon, which was 
a remarkable nudge towards the completion of the single market.
14
 The judgement led to a 
conclusion, that a product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member State must be accepted 
in another Member State. As such, when it comes to free movement of goods, from mutual 
recognition follows a presumption that when a product is produced and marketed in one Member 
State, it should be allowed to be manufactured and sold in another Member State without 
hindrance.
15
 From the case of Cassis de Dijon onwards mutual recognition has been applied to 
aspects other than free movement of goods; free movement of services being an example. Cassis de 
Dijon was not only a judicial decision contributing heavily to single market, but also an example of 
interpretation aimed at integrating market, fending off political stagnation and euro-pessimism.
16
    
 
Mutual recognition principle was added by the Commission that found it hard to harmonise 
different national regulations to guarantee free movement of goods and services between Member 
States. To combat this situation the Commission made the decision to implement mutual recognition  
principle as a tactic to harmonise at the economic level.
17
 
 
According to the European Commission the principle of mutual recognition plays an integral role 
protecting free movement of goods and services. By using the principle of mutual recognition the 
problems that come with trying to harmonise national legislation can be avoided. Thus, when it 
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comes to economic integration, mutual recognition is a remarkable factor.
18
 Due to principle of 
mutual recognition Member States may not in their territory forbid sale of a product that has been 
lawfully produced and marketed in another Member State, even if the product in question is 
produced using different quality or technical specifications from those that are used in its own 
products. The Member State in which these products from another Member State are being sold at,  
may waive this rule only in strict situations, where there are overriding requirements. Same rules 
also apply when it comes to services.
19
   
 
Mutual recognition can be viewed as an intricate set of duties of loyalty affecting the relationships 
between Member States of the EU.
20
 Mutual recognition is a broad concept, regulated by law, that 
covers several areas, such as: single market, professional qualifications, asylum decisions in the 
European Asylum System, judicial cooperation in civilian matters and judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters.
21
      
 
 
2.2 Composition of mutual recognition as a part of EU criminal law 
 
 
2.2.1 Mutual trust 
 
 
In the field of criminal cooperation, the justification of mutual recognition lies in mutual trust. What 
this means is that Member States trust each others criminal law systems and are willing to accept 
the outcomes of their decisions. Mutual recognition presupposes mutual trust and such trust is based 
on Member States` ‖shared commitment to the principles of freedom, democracy and respect for 
human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.‖22 
 
Mutual trust builds common confidence on the common denominators of a common legal culture. 
Within Member States` common constitutional traditions, in article 6 TEU and in the ECHR are 
embedded the common denominators working as building blocks. Behind mutual recognition there 
is mutual trust garnering value; it does so by safeguarding the fundamental rights and freedoms of  
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the Member States. Mutual recognition instruments, upon which cooperation is based on, presume a  
satisfactory level of fundamental rights protection. This is closely connected to the possibility that 
cooperation is possible between Member States without having to harmonise criminal law. It is said 
that mutual trust precludes the necessity of having to harmonise underlying rules.
23
         
 
Mutual trust is quite an appealing approach in principle because it allows mutual recognition, which  
requires very little change at a national level, while making far reaching international cooperation 
possible. The concept has still been somewhat problematic. The question of whether a sufficient 
amount of mutual trust exists, is something that arises often. This could be seen for example when 
EAW was to be implemented. The presupposition that mutual trust simply exist might have been 
somewhat optimistic. There were debates in Member States around the topic of deficiencies in 
procedural safeguards in other Member States. Due to there being a lack mutual trust, many 
Member States failed to implement the EAW in time.
24
 Mutual trust is a matter that arises, not only 
when Union legislation is implemented, but also when one applies the implemented national 
legislation. Thus, mutual recognition implies that the State which is executing finds the justice 
system of the requesting state trustworthy. 
 
The assumption of mutual trust has been disputed by several academics. According to these 
academics, the condition of mutual trust should be considered as problematic in light of the ever 
increasing removal of intermediate procedures and formalities. The aim of full abolishment of 
exequatur
25
 procedure can be used as an example, because it requires a vast amount of mutual trust 
and it is doubtful whether such confidence towards mutual trust between Member States truly 
exists. There is also a possibility that the abolition of exequatur could have a negative effect on 
European integration, thus making the Member States prone to enforcing judgements in the 
domestic legal order.
26
       
 
There are three alternatives for analysing mutual trust. Firstly, it is possible to examine mutual trust 
from an empirical point of view with the idea of trying to prove its existence. Secondly, it could be 
found to exist when studying mutual recognition instruments and their use. Thirdly, mutual trust 
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9 
could be perceived as an ideological concept existing because there is a belief that it exists.
27
   
 
First, the empirical part. Trust between Member States could be perceived to have existed during 
the time of traditional cooperation in criminal matters. In the preamble of the 1972 European 
Convention on the Transfer of Proceedings in Criminal Matters had a reference to trust.
28
 In 
Gözütok and Brügge ECJ stated that: 
  
‖there is a necessary implication that the Member States have mutual trust in their criminal justice 
systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in force in the other Member States even 
when the outcome would be different if its own national law were applied‖29 
 
Mutual trust has been around for some time and as such it is reasonable ground for mutual 
recognition to be based on this principle. Suffice to say mutual trust is still an abstract principle, to 
some extent.
30
 
 
Secondly, there are mutual recognition instruments based on mutual trust. For example there are 
EAW, FFWD, and the CFWD, which all mention that mutual recognition and framework decisions 
suppose mutual trust between Member States as a basis.
31
 ‖Perfect trust between the Member States 
as to the quality and reliability of their political and legal systems‖, was said to be necessary in the 
Commissions proposal for the EAW.
32
  It seems as if mutual trust is required as a foundation for 
these framework decisions. 
 
And lastly there is the ideological approach, which could also be seen as foundations of mutual 
trust. Mutual trust is understanding each others legal orders, and accepting them, even though there 
might be to some extent differing views in the legal order of the Member State placing that trust. 
Comparable protection of personal freedoms and fundamental rights is paramount for the 
acceptance to work.
33
 Because of common legal cultures there can be mutual trust. For examples of 
common legal culture we can raise the principle of legality, the presumption of innocence, the 
principle of fair trial and the principle of humanity.
34
 Also the common core principles of freedom, 
democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law, to name a few,  
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are a deeper basis for mutual trust. This trust is made easier to accept by the approximation of 
national criminal law.
35
 There is a need to further and enhance mutual trust between Member States. 
Essential element in doing this and establishing a stronger mutual trust is an approximation of 
substantive and procedural criminal law.
36
 
 
An ever bigger need for mutual trust is always required. Because of the impact that mutual 
recognition could have on the individual citizen, it is obvious that Member States are not that eager 
to comply with requests coming from other Member States. This is especially the case if a request 
would imply the mutual recognition of a judicial decision restricting or depriving persons liberty. 
Due to lacking minimum set of common standards of procedural rights, it is even more the case. 
The differences between Member States procedural rights and guarantees remain huge, despite the 
fact that all Member States have joined the ECHR. On top of that, there are many divergences 
concerning the specific design of criminal proceedings and the division of power in each Member 
State internally. Criminal law, national sovereignty, political and ideological viewpoints have a 
close connection, which leads to Member States being frequently convinced that the rules they have 
are the best rules.
37
 
 
It has been widely argued that to apply mutual recognition to judicial decisions in criminal matters a 
higher level of trust between the Member States is required than in the case of economic 
integration.
38
 This is due to the somewhat invading nature of mutual recognition. Jurisdiction to 
enforce has been removed from national territory. Unlike harmonisation, mutual recognition does 
not require Member States to adapt their national law, but it requires Member States to enforce 
judicial decisions in its own territory that would not have been in its domestic legal order. A close 
link between judicial decisions in criminal affairs and fundamental rights and freedoms makes it 
difficult to accept a decision that would never have been made domestically. The concern is a 
barrier that is uniquely occurring to such a degree in the field of criminal law.
39
 
 
 
2.2.2 Opinion 2/13 
 
 
On December 18th
 
2014 the Court gave its opinion 2/13 on the compatibility of the EU law and the 
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draft agreement designed for allowing accession of EU to the ECHR. The Court decided that the 
draft agreement was not compatible with EU law. There were quite a few incompatibilities and the 
decision of the Court made accession nearly impossible. Only the incompatibilities with mutual 
trust will be looked at here. 
 
The Court stated that: ―In so far as the ECHR would, in requiring the EU and the Member States to 
be considered Contracting Parties not only in their relations with Contracting Parties which are not 
Member States of the EU but also in their relations with each other, including where such relations 
are governed by EU law, require a Member State to check that another Member State has observed 
fundamental rights, even though EU law imposes an obligation of mutual trust between those 
Member States, accession is liable to upset the underlying balance of the EU and undermine the 
autonomy of EU law.‖40 
  
This created a major obstacle to the accession. The problem arises with the interpretation of the 
aforementioned paragraph 194. If read narrowly, the paragraph of the opinion would mean that a 
rule must be developed in order to exempt application of the ECHR between Member States in 
situations in which mutual recognition instruments are in question. A broader reading of the 
paragraph could mean that the Court expects non-application of the ECHR when dealing between 
the EU Member States in cases where their relations are dictated by EU law. In both cases, the 
situation is problematic.
41
 
 
This opposition reflects on the two different functions the two Courts have. The Court of Justice is 
not there to decide on individual cases as much as interpret EU law regarding the objectives of the 
EU, thus allowing Member States to apply this law to individuals while being in compliance with 
the EU law. The European Court´s role, on the other hand, is to make sure that the applicant´s 
treatment in a case is handled according to the rules.
42
    
 
 
2.2.3 Ne bis in idem 
 
 
Ne bis in idem principle has to presume that there is mutual trust between the EU Member States 
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when it comes to their criminal justice systems. As the Court stated in Gözütok and Brügge: ―In 
those circumstances, whether the ne bis in idem principle enshrined in Article 54 of the CISA is 
applied to procedures whereby further prosecution is barred (regardless of whether a court is 
involved) or to judicial decisions, there is a necessary implication that the Member States have 
mutual trust in their criminal justice systems and that each of them recognises the criminal law in 
force in the other Member States even when the outcome would be different if its own national law 
were applied.‖43 
 
The limits of mutual recognition should extend beyond the coercive power of a Member State, in 
the form of a positive instrument of criminal law which can be used even where defendants are 
discovered outside the territorial boundaries of that Member State. Ne bis in idem denies the right to 
prosecute an individual for acts that have been subject to final disposal in another Member State.
44
 
in Turanský the court stated that: ‖A decision which does not, under the law of the first Contracting 
State which instituted criminal proceedings against a person, definitively bar further prosecution at 
national level cannot, in principle, constitute a procedural obstacle to the opening or continuation of 
criminal proceedings in respect of the same acts against that person in another Contracting State‖.45    
 
Having been through a development, beginning from being linked to Article 54 of the Schengen 
convention, ne bis in idem principle is at a point where the ECJ considers it to be a general principle 
of the EU law.
46
 In Gözütok and Brügge, paragraph 38 and the following case law, ECJ has 
approached the matter from a viewpoint of whether dual prosecutions are obstacles to freedom of 
movement.
47
 ECJ has given a broad interpretation concerning final disposal. The concept includes 
plea-bargain settlements,
48
 and acquittals for lack of evidence.
49
 There are limits to this and the 
court has  seen that where there is no determination on the merits of the case but a prosecution is 
abandoned in favour of one already in progress in another Member State, that decision does not 
preclude the other prosecution.
50
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2.2.4 Mutual recognition in criminal matters within EU primary law 
 
 
Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in 2009, has changed the foundation parameters of 
European criminal law. The third pillar is no more and provisions on criminal law are melded into 
the general part of the EU law. Criminal law holds no longer a special place when compared with 
the EU general law. 
51
   
 
The importance of mutual recognition is highlighted in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. Within it is stated that: ‖The Union shall endeavour to ensure a high level of 
security through measures to prevent and combat crime, racism and xenophobia, and through 
measures for coordination and cooperation between police and judicial authorities and other 
competent authorities, as well as through the mutual recognition of judgements in criminal matters 
and, if necessary, through the approximation of criminal laws.‖52 The Commission can make a 
proposal with which the council of the European Union may adopt measures that put forth the 
arrangements Member States can use to conduct objective and impartial evaluation of the 
implementation of the EU policies. When it comes to Area of freedom, security and justice the 
Member States` authorities partake in full application of mutual recognition.
53
 
 
Also, in the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union it is stated that: ‖Judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters in the Union shall be based on the principle of mutual recognition of judgements 
and judicial decisions and shall include the approximation of the laws and regulations of the 
Member States in the areas referred to in paragraph 2 and in Article 83.‖54 
 
Mutual recognition is a basic principle in cooperation in criminal matters in The EU, working 
besides approximation of the laws and regulations.
55
 The principle of mutual recognition in judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters borrowed from concepts that the single market had used to great 
success. After mixing in some Council of Europe conventions, the strategy had been created.
56
 This 
being said, mutual recognition in EU is a general objective. It has not been introduced as an 
obligation with direct effect in the Member States.
57
 
                                                 
51 
Suominen 2011, 34.
 
52 
Article 67(3) of the TFEU.
 
53 
Article 70 of the TFEU.
 
54 
Article 82(1) of the TFEU.
 
55 
Klimek 2016, 11.
 
56 
Baca 2014, 478.
 
57 
Klimek 2016, 11.
 
14 
Also within the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union it is stated that: ‖To the extent 
necessary to facilitate mutual recognition of judgements and judicial decisions and police and 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters having a cross border dimension, the European Parliament 
and the Council may, by means of directives adopted in accordance with the ordinary legislative 
procedure, establish minimum rules. Such rules shall take into account the differences between the 
legal traditions and systems of the Member States. They shall concern:‖58 
 
– mutual admissibility of evidence between Member State 
– the rights of individuals in criminal procedure 
– the rights of victims of crime 
– any other specific aspects of criminal procedure which the Council has identified in advance   
by a decision; for the adoption of such a decision, the Council shall act unanimously after obtaining 
the consent of the European Parliament 
  
All legislation coming to the area of freedom, security and justice, including cooperation in criminal 
mattes, must be adopted through directives, under the standard legislative means. It should be said 
that establishment of minimum rules does not prevent Member States from upholding or creating a 
higher level of standard of protection to for individuals.
59
 To use some examples: ‖The level of 
protection should never fall below the standards provided by the ECHR or the Charter as interpreted 
in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights or the Court of Justice of the European 
Union‖,60 and ‖ The level of protection should never fall below the standards provided by the 
ECHR as interpreted in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights.
61
 
 
Substantive criminal law is addressed in Article 83(1) TFEU. Within the article it is stated that 
directives can be adopted in order to establish minimum rules when it comes to the definition of  
criminal offences and sanctions. Also within the article it is stated that this is applicable in areas ‖of 
particularly serious crimes with a cross-border dimension resulting from the nature of or impact of 
such offences or from special need to combat them on common basis.‖ The aforementioned crimes 
are listed: terrorism, trafficking in human beings and sexual exploitation of women and children, 
illicit drug and arms trafficking, corruption, money laundering, organised crime, counterfeiting of 
means of payment and computer crime. Other areas of crime can be identified as relevant by the 
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unanimous Council adopting a decision.
62
 
 
Furthermore Article 83(2) states: ‖If the approximation of criminal laws and regulations of the 
Member States proves essential to ensure the effective implementation of a Union policy in an area 
which has been subject to harmonisation measures, directives may establish minimum rules with 
regard to the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area concerned. Such directives 
shall be adopted by the same ordinary or special legislative procedure as was followed for the 
adoption of the harmonisation measures in question, without prejudice to Article 76.‖63 
 
As such, minimum rules can be established by directives, if to achieve effective implementation in 
an Union area which falls under harmonisation measures it is necessary to harmonise criminal law. 
In the concerned area this has an influence on the definition of criminal offences and sanctions. The 
legislative procedure for the initial harmonisation measure in question and these criminal law 
directives is the same.
64
 
 
In Article 82(3) and 83(3) there is included an emergency break. In case a Member States thinks 
that a draft directive might affect its criminal justice systems` fundamental points, it may request 
that the draft is referred to the European Council. The ordinary legislative procedure is thus 
suspended. The draft is referred back to the Council, if there is a consensus in the European 
Council.  At least nine Member States can continue the draft process, even if there is a 
disagreement. At such a time the rules of enhanced cooperation begin to apply. An exception to this 
is that it does not apply for Article 82(1), in which the main legal basis for mutual recognition 
resides.
65
 
 
The mutual recognition has been put into the top of the EU law. But it still has not been put forth as 
an obligation with direct effect in Member States. It is still just a general objective. There is an 
expectation that it will, in the future, be considered as a basic principle of the domestic procedural 
criminal laws in the same way ne bis in idem and presumption of innocence are. The Treaty on the 
functioning of European Union has given the mutual recognition in judicial decisions in criminal 
matters effect and relevance.
66
 
 
There have been similar views among scholars. Mutual recognition has been perceived to be a 
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journey leading to unknown destination, where national authorities are in principle required to 
acknowledge standards rising from other Member States. All this is based on mutual trust and  
formality is expected to be at minimum.
67
 Mutual recognition permeating into the area of 
international cooperation could also seen as an ambitious and rational approach.
68
 Also, for the area 
of freedom, security and justice mutual recognition of judicial decision could be seen as a key 
element.
69
 
 
With the adoption of Lisbon Treaty on 2007, the pillar structure was no more, which led to criminal 
law cooperation, with some limitations set in the Treaty, taking place at a supranational level. Also, 
unanimity was no longer required for decisions to be made, and because of that it became easier to 
adopt legislation.
70
 
 
 
2.2.5 Mutual recognition in criminal matters within EU secondary law 
     
 
2.2.5.1 Introduction 
 
 
When considering mutual recognition of judicial decisions in criminal matters, there is a legal order 
which binds Member States and is also binding upon other areas of EU law. This legal order is 
created by European Commission, the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. 
This legal order is construed mainly by one type of secondary EU law: directives. Framework 
Decisions are another type of secondary law that is not enacted anymore, not after Lisbon Treaty. 
Before delving into these two, there are few things to mention. Firstly, framework decisions and 
directives are instruments Member States have, that do not require ratification in all Member States 
as is case in Conventions. Secondly, directives and framework decisions are prevalent in many areas 
of EU law, but this part will concentrate only on mutual recognition in criminal matters.
71
    
 
Mutual recognition instruments have a tendency to share similar features that can be considered 
general features of mutual recognition. Mutual recognition instruments have an inclination to limit 
the extent to which requesting Member States can require double criminality. Also, mutual 
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recognition instruments try to limit other grounds for refusal which may be invoked. They provide 
harmonised forms for use in issuing demands for recognition. As a main rule, mutual recognition 
instruments provide a specific circumstances in which a Member State can or must refuse 
execution. If a ground for refusal is not within the instrument, it cannot be reliably invoked. Certain 
fundamental rights are to respected in this matter, and this respect towards them is embedded in the 
EU legal tradition. This, however, is taken as granted in many instruments of mutual recognition.
72
 
 
 
2.2.5.2 Case Pupino 
 
 
The case of Pupino
73
 has emerged as one of the most discussed cases of the ECJ concerning 
constitutional law and European criminal law in European dimension.
74
 
 
In the heart of the case there was a reference for a preliminary ruling
75
, which concerned the 
interpretation of the framework decision on the standing of the victims in criminal proceedings.
76
 
The reference for a preliminary ruling was sent by a judge in charge of preliminary enquiries at the 
Tribunale di Firenze.
77
 The matter was about proceedings against Maria Pupino, who was a nursery 
school teacher accused of injuring her underaged pupils. The question given to the ECJ was about 
whether this act, that had not been implemented in Italian law, affected the interpretation that was 
meant to be given to the provisions of the Italian Code of Criminal Procedure on when special 
procedures could be used for especially vulnerable victims giving evidence. The interpretation 
before was, in case of relevant provisions, that the special procedures were not available for the 
victims of the offences charged.
78
 
 
In the Pupino case the ECJ had the chance to state its view on the effects of framework decisions in 
national law in case of lack of implementation. The ECJ stated the following: ‖In the light of all the 
above considerations, the Court concludes that the principle of conforming interpretation is binding 
in relation to framework decisions adopted in the context of Title VI of the Treaty on European 
Union. When applying national law, the national court that is called upon to interpret it must do so 
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as far as possible in the light of the wording and purpose of the framework decision in order to 
attain the result which it pursues and thus comply with Article 34(2) (b) EU.‖79 The ECJ also stated: 
‖In the light of all the above considerations, the answer to the question must be that Articles 2, 3 
and 8(4) of the Framework Decision must be interpreted as meaning that the national court must be 
able to authorise young children, who, as in this case, claim to have been victims of maltreatment, 
to give their testimony in accordance with arrangements allowing those children to be guaranteed an 
appropriate level of protection, for example outside the trial and before it takes place. The national 
court is required to take into consideration all the rules of national law and to interpret them, so far 
as possible, in the light of the wording and purpose of the Framework Decision.‖80 
 
Pupino was the first case to break distinctions between the law of the First and the third pillars of 
the EU. Interpreting the case, however, is no easy task. When using functional interpretation the 
ECJ in the Pupino case arrived at a conclusion that direct effect is embedded into framework 
decisions the same way it is to directives of the First Pillar. The ECJ argued for the supremacy of 
the EU law to be the case, not only in First Pillar, but also in third pillar. Courts of the Member 
States are expected to adopt a proeuropean interpretation of the constitutional provisions. On the 
other hand, the ECJ gave the framework decisions all the effectivity it could.
81
 National courts were 
placed at the centre of the action and changes to the enforcement of the third pillar instruments were 
significant.
82
      
 
When implemented late, incorrectly, or not at all, framework decisions do not have direct effect 
unlike directives.
83
 
 
 
2.2.5.3 Case of Advocaten voor de Wereld 
 
 
Advocaten voor de Wereld was a case in which the ECJ further developed the compatibility of 
framework decisions. The case concerned one of the first mutual recognition measures: the 
European arrest warrant.
84
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In the case an association ‖Advocaten voor de Wereld‖ brought an action before the Belgian 
arbitration court seeking to annul the Belgian law transposing the provisions of the framework 
decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States. The 
Belgian court referred to the ECJ a host of questions concerning the validity of the framework 
decision.
85
 
 
One of the questions was: ‖Is the Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant compatible 
with article 34(2)(b) of the Treaty on the European Union, under which Framework Decisions may 
be adopted only for the purpose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member 
States.‖ The referring court was unsure whether the Framework Decision on the European arrest 
warrant was the appropriate instrument, holding that the European arrest warrant should have been 
implemented through a convention instead.
86
 
 
The ECJ found that the Article 34 EU does not establish any sort of priority between the different 
instruments listed in that provision. As such, it cannot be ruled out that the Council may have a 
choice between the instruments mentioned in order for it to regulate the same subject-matter, 
subject only to the limits the selected instrument itself provides. It is true that European arrest 
warrant could have reasonably been a subject of a convention, but it is up to the Council to decide if 
it wishes to give preference to the legal instrument of the framework decision in a case, such as this,  
where the conditions of adopting such a measure are met.
87
      
 
This was the case that gave ECJ great chance to make a statement through decision to settle the 
question of the European arrest warrant. EAW had been a controversial and sensitive matter in 
which there was structural issues concerning EU, national constitutional limits, and the authority of 
European and national courts.
88
 
 
The decision was hardly surprising. If the ECJ had leaned towards accepting the position of the 
plaintiff, the repercussions would have been more dire. If ECJ had declared EAW, which was the 
first instrument incorporating mutual recognition, as being incompatible with fundamental rights, it 
would have made further development of judicial cooperation immensely more difficult. However, 
as stated before, the court did not uphold the position taken by the plaintiff and rather upheld the 
Framework Decision. The judgement of this case on the EAW is the first of its kind and it allowed 
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this flagship instrument of EU judicial cooperation to truly take root.
89
 
 
 
2.3 Mutual recognition and harmonisation 
 
 
Mutual recognition was chosen as the main solution before any harmonisation of criminal law. Due 
to desire to avoid harmonisation was, at least in 1999, one of the main reasons for choosing mutual 
recognition as the form of cooperation.
90
 In criminal law mutual recognition and harmonisation 
have been considered as two different approaches, despite the differences they have.
91
   
 
Harmonisation and mutual recognition in criminal matters are often thought to be two alternatives. 
Individuals opposing harmonisation argue that criminal law can effectively only be dealt with at a 
national level, as the culture of the nation plays a key role. Due to this, according to the critics,  
harmonisation is a repressive approach, because it involves applying same level of punishment to 
all the Member States, despite there being clear differences in qualifying crimes in different legal 
systems. Once mutual recognition is set, a system that is harmonised at all levels is not the best 
possible solution in the context of cooperation in criminal matters. Those, on the other hand, who 
are in support of harmonisation consider it to be a effective way to combat transnational crime. 
Also, individuals in support of harmonisation believe it to give a better safeguard against violations 
of human rights. Those who hold this view think that mutual recognition does not allow evaluation 
of fairness of trial, especially when it comes to evidence gathered abroad.
92
 
 
Mutual recognition differs from harmonisation. First it might seem like the argument is that 
harmonisation aims to eliminate differences and create a unified system possibly with one judicial 
court and one system, while on the other hand mutual recognition keeps differences within a system 
of mutual trust and cooperation. In harmonisation there is a common normative ground to which 
many subjects agree at the same time. While in mutual recognition there are quite a few normative 
standards that co-exist and every subject has the right to impose its own standard by requesting 
another subject to incorporate it into its system.
93
 
 
The problems attached to the principle of mutual recognition can be viewed as a reason for 
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21 
harmonisation. Originally the principle of mutual recognition was adopted with the idea that 
harmonisation can be avoided, but this system based only on mutual recognition has received 
criticism. There has been views that mutual recognition actually needs some minimum level of 
harmonisation as a precondition to work properly.
94
 
 
However, the current justice system of the Union is filled with problems from the viewpoint of 
harmonisation. Each Member State has its own criminal justice system, and on top of that the 
Member States and the EU have a shared competence in the area of freedom, security and justice 
when bringing about legislation in this field. As directives are the most encompassing form which 
the Union can use in matters of criminal law, directly applicable legislative instruments cannot be 
used to try to harmonise the systems of the Member States. As such, this brings about a justice 
system that is based on the cooperation of many different systems. Thus, as long as there are 
individual jurisdictions in Member States, the need for mutual recognition is greater than that of 
harmonisation.
95
    
 
Yet another problem rises from trying to define these two terms – harmonisation and mutual 
recognition – because both seem to be used with different purposes and in different context, and at 
times without reasonable coherence. Harmonisation is in some cases perceived more as 
approximation of rules, as it is about bringing different laws of different Member States closer to 
each other. At times harmonisation only refers to procedural criminal law, and other times to 
substantive criminal law. To some academics harmonisation does not mean elimination of 
differences but rather elimination of conflicts between different legal systems. Yet, it is a reasonable 
belief that some disparities must disappear for a common model of law to function properly. 
Because all of this, in order to have a better view of harmonisation, we can distinguish different 
degrees, starting from the lowest, approximation, and moving to the highest, unification.
96
 
 
As a form of cooperation mutual recognition allows the procedural and criminal legal systems of 
the Member States to function despite there being differences. These differences between Member 
States are accepted but at the same time they are dismissed as impediments of cooperation.
97
 There 
is a possibility mutual recognition was not widely discussed before the principle was launched. This 
is because it was applied instead of harmonisation.
98
 As Peers put it: 
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 ‖Because the Council has made the error of assuming that the underlying law need not be 
 comparable. The application of the principle as it has developed in the criminal matters is 
 not defensible, and should be reconsidered to align it with the application of the principle in 
 the internal market, which usually requires either at least some basic comparability of 
 underlying national laws before applying mutual recognition pursuant to the EC Treaty free 
 movement rules, or the adoption of EC legislation to ensure that those national laws are 
 sufficiently comparable.‖99 
 
All in all, when using narrow interpretation, the principle of mutual recognition does not need 
harmonisation.
100
 This being said, harmonisation in some form is recommended and even 
considered necessary in order to create a base level of trust upon which mutual recognition can be 
based on. As such, mutual recognition and harmonisation should not be considered as alternatives, 
but rather viewed as two approaches that compliment each other. 
101
 For the mutual recognition of 
foreign decision not to become increasingly difficult, even impossible, it is paramount to have some 
level of harmonisation.
102
 It is reasonable starting point to assume that if a Member State is to 
accept a foreign decision as if it was a national decision, there must be some prerequisite for the 
national system to, at the very least, acknowledge such a decision. It would be ridiculous to think 
that a Member State would acknowledge a foreign judicial decision, with imminent consequences, 
if it did not know the content of said decision, or even that such a decision exists. For mutual 
recognition to flourish, it is important to recognise that it is not only the recognition itself that is 
important, but also the execution matters: recognition must lead to legal consequences.
103
    
 
 
2.4 Conclusions 
 
 
Mutual recognition requires another Member State to accept the decision of another Member State, 
even if that decision has no place in its legal system. This whole acceptance has roots in mutual 
trust, and would be impossible without it. To give light how important of a principle mutual 
recognition truly is, it could be defined as a legal principle that is the cornerstone of EU cooperation 
in criminal matters.  
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Harmonisation and mutual recognition are by no means simply options to choose from when it 
comes to cooperation in criminal matters. As is shown, mutual trust requires some level of 
harmonisation to be possible. And mutual trust in turn is required for mutual recognition to be 
possible. So it seems that the two, mutual recognition and harmonisation, are in a mutually 
beneficial relationship. A certain amount of harmonisation is always required in order to set the 
frame in which mutual recognition works. 
 
Mutual trust between Member States has been highlighted, and the necessity for it has become an 
impediment when it comes to EU joining the ECHR, as is seen in Opinion 2/13. This has created a 
lock, preventing EU joining ECHR, to which certain solutions have been suggested. One possibility 
is exempting application of ECHR between Member States in cases where mutual recognition 
instruments are in question. Another suggestion would be that ECHR is not applied in cases where 
the relations between EU Member States are dictated by EU law   
 
 
3. European Arrest Warrant 
 
 
3.1 General outlines of the EAW 
 
 
3.1.1 The birth of the EAW 
 
 
It should be noted that, at least at the very beginning, the purpose of the drafters of the first 
documents of the mutual recognition agenda was not clear. In 2000 Programme on mutual 
recognition, the priority rating 1 was given to mutual recognition of decisions on the freezing of 
evidence and on mutual recognition of orders to freeze assets. The creation of arrest warrant was 
given a priority rating 2 and even then it was to be limited only to the most serious of offences that 
were mentioned in former article 29 TFEU: terrorism, drug trafficking, trafficking in humans and 
offences against children, trafficking in weapons, corruption and fraud.
104
 
 
Despite there being efforts made in the 80s and 90s, it was the 9/11 attacks in the USA in 2001 that 
built political pressure to find new means to fight the terrorist threat. The plane attacks against New 
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York and Washington brought international terrorism to the top of the European political agenda. 
And although the attacks were made against the USA, it was perceived as an attack against the 
whole of western world. In the immediate aftermath all European leaders condemned the attacks 
and gave their support to the USA. The then prime minister of UK, Tony Blair, stated that the fight 
against terrorism was not one that was waged between the USA and terrorism but rather one that 
was waged between free world and terrorism. The rise of international terrorism made it a necessity 
to bring about a new counter-terrorist strategy.
105
 This being said, the need for new mechanisms of 
cooperation had already made the European countries initiate a programme of mutual recognition 
since the end of 90s.
106
 
 
Due to the 9/11 attacks the European Commission submitted a Proposal for a Framework Decision 
on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States on 19
th
 of 
September, 8 days after the attacks occurred.
107
 When preparing the proposal, the departments of 
the European Commission organised a host of interviews in the EU Member States with legal 
practitioners, judicial officers, lawyers, academics and ministry officials responsible for extradition 
in nearly all EU Member States. It came to be that there was no reason to distinguish between 
situations in which extradition is requested at the pre-trial phase and when it is requested for the 
execution of an enforceable judgement.
108
 
 
On 21
st
 September 2001 the Council gathered to an extraordinary session to analyse what the 
international situation was following the terrorist attacks  in the USA and to put forth the necessary 
impetus to the actions of the EU. On the matters of enhancing police and judicial cooperation the 
European Council signified its agreement to introduce the EAW. The decision was in line with the 
European Councils conclusions in Tampere. The European Council stated that the EAW would 
supplant the system of extradition between the EU Member States. Also, it was mentioned that the 
extradition procedures did not reflect on the confidence and integration between the EU Member 
States. The EAW was to allow wanted persons to be directly handed over from one jurisdiction to 
another.
109
 
 
During the negotiations in December 2001, the strongest proponent to resist the EAW was Italy. 
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25 
Thus, on the 6
th
 and 7
th
 of December 2001 the JHA Council  failed to reach an agreement on the 
EAW. This was due to the opposition from Italy. From then 15 Member States only Italy did not 
accept the compromise reached by the 14 Member States.
110
 An agreement was nearly reached but 
there was a veto of then Italian Minister of Justice, whose objection was about the number of 32 
categories of crimes in the Proposal. Italy wanted to have the list of offences to be reduced from 32 
to 6.
111
 
 
On 6
th
 of February 2002 the European Parliament approved the Councils draft without any 
amendment. The Italian veto was removed due to pressure from the European governments. The 
Council of the EU adopted the framework decision on 13
th
 of June 2002. As such, the legal basis for 
the EAW, at the EU level, that was addressed for all the EU Member States, became the Framework 
decision on the European arrest warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States 
(2002/584/JHA.) It was considered to be the flagship of the EU´s immediate legal reaction to the 
9/11 events.
112
 
 
The EAW was pushed through as an `emergency legislation` and it has radically changed the nature 
of cooperation on extradition. It also constitutes as a strong precedent for the application of mutual 
recognition in criminal matters in the European Union. This can be seen in the Preamble of the 
Framework Decision that says that the warrant ―is the first concrete measure in the field of criminal 
law implementing the principle of mutual recognition which the European Council  referred to as 
the cornerstone of judicial cooperation.
113
 
 
The EAW is a judicial decision that is issued by a Member State with a purpose of arresting and 
surrendering of an individual by another Member State for the purpose of conducting a criminal 
prosecution or executing a custodial sentence or detention order.
114
 
 
The Framework Decision on the EAW entered into force on 1
st
 of January 2004. The EAW 
abolished formal extradition that was in place between the EU Member States. It replaced the 
former formal extradition with a system of surrender between judicial authorities of the EU Member 
States. Due to this the EU made a significant leap towards its aspiration of becoming an area of 
freedom, security and justice.
115
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Many governments, however, became wary of the possibility that European Union had acted too 
hastily. Also, there are some legal scholars that have argued that the creation of the EAW was a step 
made too soon.
116
 
 
 
3.1.2 General definition and principles of the EAW 
 
 
It was on 13 June 2002 that the Council Framework Decision on the European arrest warrant and 
the surrender of persons was adopted. The EAW, at the time, was treated as the first concrete 
measure in the field of criminal law when it came to implementing the principle of mutual 
recognition. For the European Union the EAW was considered to be a cornerstone of judicial 
cooperation. The EAW was declared to be a success by the European Commission as it allowed 
faster and simpler mechanism of surrender of requested persons for the purposes of conducting 
criminal prosecution or executing a detention order or a custodial sentence than the previous 
traditional system of extraction.   
 
The European Arrest warrant is a judicial decision issued by a Member State of the European Union 
with a view to the arrest and surrender by another Member State of the European Union of a 
requested person, for the purposes of conducting a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial 
sentence or detention order.
117
 The main parts to be considered in it are the issuing state, in which  
the offence was committed and whose authorities want to arrest a person out of their reach, and the 
executing state, where the aforementioned individual is thought to be at. The state here refers to a 
Member State and the Member States judiciary, not the government. The EAW is structured in four 
chapters consisting of general principles, the surrender procedure, the effects of surrender and final 
and general provisions.
118
 
 
As far as the general principles go, the first remarkable change was, brought about by mutual trust, 
the removal of nationality exception. It is not allowed for a Member State to refuse the surrender of 
a suspected or a convicted person based on nationality. This ban is quite classical in a sense that it 
can be found in many bilateral or multilateral arrangements. The reason for this is due to civil law 
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countries generally including it in their domestic law as an expression of a State´s sovereignty and 
as a guarantee of the fundamental rights of the individual.
119
 
 
The nationality exception is not done away completely and nationality is mentioned as an optional 
ground for refusal of execution. It, however, can be invoked only if certain conditions are fulfilled.  
It is in Articles 4(6), 5(3) and 25(1) that these possibilities of using nationality as ground for refusal 
are discussed. In next paragraph I will be looking closer said Articles and continue from there to 
other general principles.   
 
Article 4(6) states that EAW can be refused in a situation where a national or resident of executing 
State is wanted for the execution of a custodial sentence or detention order, but only on the 
condition that the executing State enforces the sentence domestically. Also, in Article 5(3) it is 
stated that in case the request for the surrender of person, who is a national, is made in order to 
prosecute in the requesting state, the executing State can make the execution conditional requiring  
that if sentenced to a custodial sentence the national will be returned to serve his or her sentence in 
there.
120
 Lastly, there is Article 25(1) that concerns conditional transit. According to it, where an 
EAW has been issued in order to prosecute an individual who is a national or resident of the State of 
transit, can subject the transit to the condition that the individual, after being heard, is returned there 
to serve the detention order or custodial sentence.
121
 
 
In Articles 3(2), 4(2), 4(3) and 4(5) the Framework Decision approaches the ne bis in idem 
principle. Ne bis in idem is a ground for mandatory non-execution in cases where the judicial 
authority is informed that the individual against whom the EAW has been issued has been finally 
judged by a Member State of the same act. This is the case, provided that, where there has been a 
sentence, the sentence is currently served, it has been passed or it may no longer be executed under 
the law of the sentencing Member State. Third Member States are included in this wording. Also, 
optional non-execution is possible in three cases: ―a) where the requested person is being 
prosecuted in the executing Member State for the same act as that on which the EAW is based; 
b)where the judicial authorities of the executing Member State have decided either not to prosecute 
for the offence or to halt proceedings, or where a final judgement has been passed upon the 
requested person in a Member State, in respect of the same acts, which prevent further proceedings; 
c) where the requested authority is informed that the person has been finally judged by a third Non-
Member State in respect for the same acts, provided that, where there has been a sentence, the 
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sentence has been served or is currently being served or may no longer be executed under the law of 
the sentencing country.‖122 
 
Next there is the principle of double criminality. Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW states that the issuing Member State cannot refuse from recognising an offence that underlies 
the EAW on the ground that it is not a crime in domestic legal order if this offence falls under the 32 
crimes listed in the Framework Decision. As such, if an EAW is issued concerning one of the crimes 
on the list, the executing Member State, in principle, is required to surrender the individual who is 
sought out. Of course all the other terms of the EAW must also be met.
123
 A more insightful look at 
the list of 32 crimes will be done later in this thesis in chapter 4.3.3.        
 
Under Articles 2(4) and 4(1) of the Framework Decision on the EAW double criminality still 
remains an optional ground for refusal.
124
 Article 2(4) states that for those offences that are not 
included in the list of 32 crimes, surrender can still be subject to the condition that those acts that 
are referred to in the EAW ―constitute‖ an offence under the law of the executing Member State. As 
for the Article 4(1), it states that dual criminality is not applicable in cases in which the law of the  
requested State does not impose the same type of duty or tax or does not contain rules of the same 
type regarding taxes, customs and duties and exchange regulations as the law of the State of the 
issue. This applies in all cases differences exist in where there is punishment in the Member State 
for attempting or doing said act.
125
 
 
Behind the rule of speciality lies the historic idea that the state which is receiving may exercise its 
discretion in criminal jurisdiction only within the confines of the agreement upon which the 
surrender is based on. The conditions of the surrender are approved and checked by the sending 
state. 
  
The rule of speciality could be summarized: ―a person surrendered may not be prosecuted, 
sentenced or otherwise deprived of his or her liberty for an offence committed prior to his or her 
surrender other than that for which he or she was surrendered.‖126 The individual who is requested 
has the right to not be surrendered to a Member State other than specified executing Member State 
for the purposes of doing a criminal prosecution or executing a custodial sentence for an offence 
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that was committed before his or her surrender to the issuing Member State.
127
 Some troubles in the 
interpretation have been caused by the wording of ―for an offence...other than that for which he or 
she was surrendered‖. The Court of Justice tackled this in the case of Leymann & Pustarov.128 and 
stated: ―...it must be ascertained whether the constituent elements of the offence, according to the 
legal description given by the issuing State, are those in respect of which the person was 
surrendered and whether there is a sufficient correspondence between the information given in the 
arrest warrant and that contained in the later procedural document. Modifications concerning the 
time or place of the offence are allowed, in so far as they derive from evidence gathered in the 
course of the proceedings conducted in the issuing State concerning the conduct described in the 
arrest warrant, do not alter the nature of the offence and do not lead to grounds for non-execution 
under Articles 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision.‖ Rule of speciality contains a host of exceptions, 
which will not be examined here. 
 
There is no mention of the rule of reciprocity in the Framework Decision on the EAW. It cannot be 
found in the core text nor the preamble. As such, rule of reciprocity has been removed from the 
consideration of the EAW. 
 
In the context of extradition law rule of reciprocity entails a view that States are only willing to 
extradite persons, if they have reasonable guarantees that the requesting State would act in a same 
manner if the roles were reversed. The performances do not have to be symmetrical. Extradition 
conventions are more often than not based on a system of mutual performances and they do not 
very often contain unilateral obligations. There seems to be an agreement among scholars that the 
principle stems from the necessities of international politics, rather than that it could be considered a 
principle of justice.
129
 
 
      
3.2 Issuing the EAW 
 
 
3.2.1 Options of issuing the EAW 
 
 
The EAW is the European procedural instrument when it comes to conducting a criminal 
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prosecution or executing a detention order or a custodial sentence.
130
 There are two possible ways 
of issuing the EAW. An EAW may be issued by a Member State in two different scenarios.   
 
 1. ―A European arrest warrant may be issued for acts punishable by the law of the issuing 
 Member State by a custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at 
 least 12 months or, where a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for 
 sentences of at least four months.‖131 
 
 2. There are 32 offences that: ―if they are punishable in the issuing Member State by a 
 custodial sentence or a detention order for a maximum period of at least three years and as 
 they are defined by the law of the issuing Member State, shall, under the terms of this 
 Framework Decision and without verification of the double criminality of the act, give rise 
 to surrender pursuant to a European arrest warrant.‖132   
 
The first of these two ways can be considered a ―standard‖ way to issue an EAW. The second option 
can be viewed as ―issuing without verification of the double criminality of the offence.‖ 
 
 
3.2.2 The standard way of issuing the EAW. 
 
 
When it comes to standard issuing, there are two cases in which EAW can be issued: 
 
– existing offence punishable by the law of the issuing Member State by a custodial sentence 
or a detention order for a maximum period of at least 12 months, or 
– a sentence has been passed or a detention order has been made, for sentences of at least 4 
months.
133
 
 
In these cases, the executing state has the possibility of imposing the dual criminality requirement. 
Surrendering the requested individual may be subject to the condition that the offence for which the 
EAW has been issued is an offence under the law of the executing Member State. In these cases the 
dual criminality requirement is applied. An act must be both: an offence under the law of the 
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executing and issuing states.
134
 
 
 
3.2.3 Issuing without the verification of double criminality 
 
 
A key feature within the EAW is the included list of 32 offences for which the requirement of 
double criminality is abolished. As such, there is a softened double criminality requirement, 
meaning that when it comes to these 32 offences the double criminality is not considered by the 
judicial authority of the executing Member State that has the competence to execute the EAW. If an 
EAW is to be issued without verifying the double criminality of the act, then the next cumulative 
conditions must be met: 
 
– the offence is on the list of 32 categories of offences referred to in the Framework Decision 
on the EAW, 
– the offence is punishable by a custodial sentence or a detention order in the issuing Member 
State, 
– maximum period of a custodial sentence or a detention order takes at least 3 years, 
– the law of the issuing Member State has a definition of the offence.135 
 
The list of 32 offences cover the following:
136
 
 
– participation in a criminal organisation; 
– terrorism; 
– trafficking in human beings; 
– sexual exploitation of children and child pornography; 
– illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances; 
– illicit trafficking in weapons, munitions and explosives; 
– corruption; 
– fraud, including that affecting the financial interests of the EC within the meaning of the 
Convention on the protection of the European Communities‘ financial interests11; 
– laundering of the proceeds of crime; 
                                                 
134 
Klimek 2014, 96.
 
135 
Klimek 2014, 97.
 
136 
Article 2(2) of the Framework Decision on the EAW.
 
32 
– counterfeiting currency, including of the euro; 
– computer-related crime; 
– environmental crime, including illicit trafficking in endangered animal species 
and in endangered plant species and varieties; 
– facilitation of unauthorised entry and residence; 
– murder, grievous bodily injury; 
– illicit trade in human organs and tissue; 
– kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; 
– racism and xenophobia; 
– organised or armed robbery; 
– illicit trafficking in cultural goods, including antiques and works of art; 
– swindling; 
– racketeering and extortion; 
– counterfeiting and piracy of products; 
– forgery of administrative documents and trafficking therein; 
– forgery of means of payment; 
– illicit trafficking in hormonal substances and other growth promoters; 
– illicit trafficking in nuclear or radioactive materials; 
– trafficking in stolen vehicles; 
– rape; 
– arson; 
– crimes within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court12; 
– unlawful seizure of aircraft/ships; and 
– sabotage. 
 
The list of 32 offences may be added other categories of offences by the Council of the EU. The 
Council will examine if the list should be amended or extended. On the matter of offences not 
covered on the list, surrender might be conditional and the acts for which the EAW has been issued 
must constitute an offence according to the law of the executing Member State.
137
 
 
Even if the language of the Framework decision on the EAW states ―without verification of the 
double criminality of the act‖, there are certain Member States that have adopted laws that require 
verification.
138
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3.2.4 Transmission of the EAW 
 
 
Concerning the transmission of the EAW, there are two possibilities that can unfold: either the 
location of the sought person is known, or it is not known. 
 
If the location of the person is known, the EAW is sent directly to the executing judicial authority.
139
    
This means that the place of residence of the requested person in the other EU Member State is 
known to the authority requesting surrender by using the EAW. Suffice to say, all information that 
concerns executing and judicial authorities of all the Member States is to be found in the internet. It 
can be found on the European Judicial Network website. Within the site there is a whole section 
dedicated to the EAW.
140
 
 
A problem might occur for the issuing authority when the location of the person is not known. The 
issuing authority could face a problem where it does not know what the competent executive 
authority is. If this happens, it will have to start making requisite enquiries. In this case also, the 
contact points of the European Judicial Network are a valid line of gathering information.
141
 The 
issuing judicial authority can, if it so wants, ask the transmission to be effected through the secure 
telecommunications system of the European Judicial Network.
142
 
 
In case it is not known where the requested person is, an alert is issued in the Schengen Information 
System (SIS). Such an alert is in accordance with CISA and has the same effect as EAW. However,  
there is a transitional period until the SIS has the capability to transfer all the information that is 
required in the Framework Decision on the EAW. During this time the alert is equivalent to an EAW 
pending receipt of the original in due and proper form by the executing judicial authority. If there is 
no possibility of using SIS, transmission may happen indirectly through Interpol.
143
 
 
In fact, the issuing judicial authority is allowed to forward the EAW by any means that is secure and 
capable of producing written records. The Executing Member State must be able to check the 
authenticity of the written record. Problems arising concerning authenticity or the transmission of 
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any information or documents required to fully execute the EAW will be dealt with by direct 
contacts between the judicial authorities involved. Or, if and when it is appropriate, the central 
authorities of the Member States can become involved in the matter.
144
          
 
As for the translation of the EAW, it can be perceived as an act of intercultural communication.
145
 It 
is compulsory to translate the warrant into the official language or languages of the requested State. 
Member States, however, are allowed to deposit a declaration with the General Secretariat of the 
Council of the EU that they accept translation in one or more official languages of the institutions of 
the EU.
146
 
 
The form and the content of the EAW are stated in Article 8. To give a more precise list, an EAW 
must contain:
147
 
 
– the identity and nationality of the requested person; 
– the name, address, telephone and fax numbers and e-mail address of the issuing judicial 
authority; 
– evidence of an enforceable judgement, an arrest warrant or any other enforceable judicial 
decision having the same effect; 
– the nature and legal classification of the offence; 
– a description of the circumstances in which the offence was committed, including the time, 
place and degree of participation in the offence by the requested person; 
– the penalty imposed, if there is a final judgement, or the prescribed scale of penalties for the 
offence under the law of the issuing Member State; 
– and – if possible, other consequences of the offence. 
 
As for the form: the form appended to the Framework Decision on the EAW must be used. The 
intention behind this was to implement a working tool that can be simply filled in by the issuing 
judicial authorities and recognised by the executing judicial authorities. The main idea behind this is 
to allow the flow of information and to avoid expensive and lengthy translations. For the arrest and 
surrender of a requested person, the form consist the sole base for such an action and should be 
filled in with care.
148
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3.2.5 Proportionality test 
 
 
The EAW should only be used by judicial authorities in cases where the surrender request is in 
proportion in all circumstances of the case. Also, judicial authorities should apply a proportionality 
test in a same manner across Member States. Proportionality test can be seen as a check on top of 
verification to see whether a required threshold is met, and this is based on how appropriate the 
issuing of the EAW is when considered against the backdrop of the case.
149
        
 
Taking into account the severe consequences executing a EAW has on the requested person´s liberty 
and the restrictions of free movement, the judicial authorities issuing a EAW should be willing to 
consider a host of factors in order to determine whether issuing a EAW can be justified in each 
individual case. Some examples of what could be taken into account are: ―the seriousness of the 
offence (for example, the harm or danger it has caused); the likely penalty imposed if the person is 
found guilty of the alleged offence (for example, whether it would be a custodial sentence); the 
likelihood of detention of the person in the issuing Member State after surrender; the interests of the 
victims of the offence. Also, it is reasonable for issuing authorities to consider if there are other 
judicial cooperation measures that could be taken instead of issuing a EAW. There are legal 
instruments on judicial cooperation within the Union that, in many situations, offer a less coercive  
and more effective approach. 
150
      
 
The approach of the Member States has varied and therefore also the application of proportionality 
test varies. There has been a disproportionate use of the EAW for minor offences or for offences 
that could have been dealt with less intrusive means. This has led to unwarranted arrests and 
excessive time spent on pre-trial detention. As such, there has been a disproportionate interference 
with the burdens on the resources of the Member States and fundamental rights of suspects.
151
 
 
As EAW brought some problems regarding proportionality, especially so when it came to issuing 
EAWs for minor offences, we should briefly look at the EIO directive in which the issue was 
addressed. In the EIO there must a proportionality test within the issuing state and not in the 
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executing state when it comes to the requested measure. Subsequently, there is no additional 
proportionality test done in the executing state, and due to that no explicit ground for refusal. If 
there is disagreement between the parties, a consultation procedure is held, and this can lead to 
withdrawal of the EIO by the issuing state. Following a disagreement, if the issuing state refuses to 
withdraw the EIO and it continues to request the execution of the measure, the executing state must 
make a decision about its recognition and execution by referring on to non-recognition grounds that 
are listed in the directive. Suffice to say, a disproportionate request could lead to the invocation of a 
fundamental rights non-recognition ground, provided in Article 11.
152
 
 
 
3.3. Executing the EAW 
 
 
3.3.1 Decision to execute the EAW 
 
 
As the executing judicial authority receives a request for surrender, the first priority is to arrest the 
requested  person. 
 
A person who is arrested this way, for the purpose of the execution of a European arrest warrant,  
has a right to have an interpreter an a judicial council assist him or her in accordance with the 
national law of the executing Member State. Also, a requested person who is arrested must be made 
aware of the EAW and its contents. A requested person must also be made aware of the possibility 
of consenting to surrender to the issuing judicial authority.
153
    
 
When a requested person is arrested, the executing authority can decide if the requested person 
should be kept on detention, in accordance with the law of the executing Member State. The 
requested person can be released at any time based on the law of the executing Member State, as 
long as a competent authority of the aforementioned Member State makes certain the person does 
not flee.
154
    
 
As stated before: the requested person must be made aware of the possibility of consenting to 
surrender. If consent is given before the executing judicial authority, then Article 13 will be 
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applicable. It is possible to renounce the ―speciality rule‖ at the same time as the consent to 
surrender is given. It is up to each Member State to adopt measures that show that the consent, and 
possible renunciation of the ―speciality rule‖, are given in such a away as to make sure that the 
person in question has been a voluntary participant and in full understanding of the consequences. 
The consent and, if needed, renunciation, are recorded according to the procedure law of the 
executing Member State. It is possible to revoke consent. Each Member State may provide the 
option to revoke consent and, if needed, renunciation at the same time. This revocation will be done 
in accordance with the rules of the executing Member State. As a general rule such a revocation is 
not possible, but a Member State which wants to hold on to an exception must inform the General 
Secretariat of the Council on their decision when the Framework decision is adopted. The time 
between the date of consent and its revocation will not be considered when establishing time limits 
for the decision to execute.
155
 If this consent to surrender is not put forth by the requested person, 
there will be a hearing which will follow the law of the executing Member State.
156
 
 
EAW also makes possible conditional surrender and postponed surrender. 
 
In conditional surrender, the executing judicial authority can temporarily surrender the requested 
person to the issuing Member State provided that the Member State follows the mutual agreement 
made between the executing and issuing judicial authorities. Such an agreement will be made in 
writing and the agreed conditions must be followed by all the judicial authorities in the issuing 
Member State.
157
   
 
As for the postponed surrender, the executing judicial authority may decide to postpone the 
surrender of the requested person so that she or he can be prosecuted in the executing Member 
State. This also applies if the requested person has been sentenced and she or he is serving this 
sentence in the executing Member States territory. The act that the requested person is serving must 
be other than the one referred to in the EAW.
158
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3.3.2 Time limits for the execution and surrender 
 
 
The surrender phase of the execution of the EAW is subject to strict limits. As the Framework 
Decision on the EAW states, urgency should be the driving force when dealing with and executing 
the EAW.
159
 The reason for this urgency has two purposes. One of the purposes is that there is a 
need for a potent cooperation between States, which is why the proceedings must be sped up. This 
also helps mutual trust as the requesting State will be content due to fast handing over of the 
sentenced or suspected person. The other purpose is, that a fast surrender guarantees rights of the 
person who is subject to the EAW, as she or he does not have to go through long-term and 
exorbitant detention waiting for a decision of the court.
160
   
 
There are rules imposed on time limits by the Framework Decision on the EAW. These time limits 
can be divided in to having one of the two reasons: time limits for the decision to execute EAW and 
time limits for a surrender of person. 
 
First there are the time limits for the decision to execute EAW. When the requested person consents 
to his or her surrender, the decision on the execution of the EAW should be made within 10 days 
after consent has been given. In other cases, the final decision on the execution of the EAW should 
be made within 60 days after the arrest of the requested person has been made. In specific cases the 
European arrest warrant cannot be executed within the time limits mentioned before. In these cases 
the executing judicial authority will immediately inform the issuing judicial authority and give 
reasons for the delay. The time limit can be extended in these cases by a further 30 days.
161
 
 
As long as the executing judicial authority has not taken a final decision on the European arrest 
warrant, it will make sure the material conditions necessary for effective surrender of  the person 
remain fulfilled. If exceptional situation arises and the Member State cannot observe the time limits,  
it must inform Eurojust and explain the reason for delay. A Member State which has experienced 
repeated delays on the part of another Member State in the execution of European arrest warrants 
will inform the Council with a view to evaluating the implementation of this Framework Decision 
at Member State level.
162
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When the requested person enjoys enjoys a privilege or immunity regarding jurisdiction or 
execution in the executing Member State, the time limits will not start running unless, and counting 
from the day when, the executing judicial authority is informed of the fact that the privilege or 
immunity has been waived. The executing Member State shall ensure that the material conditions 
necessary for effective surrender are fulfilled when the person no longer enjoys such privilege or 
immunity.
163
   
 
Second, there are time limits for surrender of the person. The surrender of the requested person will 
be negotiated between the concerned authorities, and it will be done as soon as possible. The 
surrender of the requested person shall happen no later than 10 days after the final decision on the 
execution of the EAW.
164
 
 
If the surrender of the requested person is prevented in any way by circumstances beyond the 
control of any of the Member States, the executing and issuing authorities will contact each other 
immediately and agree on a new date for the surrender. In this case, the surrender will happen 
within 10 days of the new agreed date.
165
     
 
The surrender can be postponed in extraordinary cases that relate to serious humanitarian reasons. 
The example given in the article is: if there are substantial grounds to believe that the operation to 
surrender would manifestly endanger the requested person´s life or health. Once this delay is no 
more, the execution of the EAW will commence. The executing judicial authority immediately 
informs the issuing judicial authority and they agree a new surrender date. After this, the surrender 
will happen within 10 days of the new agreed date.
166
   
 
It should also be noted that when the time limits expire, if the requested person is still being 
detained, he or she will be let go.
167
 
 
 
3.3.3 Grounds for refusal to execute the EAW 
 
 
Framework Decision on the EAW is based on the principle of mutual recognition. This does not 
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40 
however mean that there is an absolute necessity to execute the issued EAW. 
 
In articles 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision on the EAW there are defined grounds upon which 
the execution of the EAW can be refused by the executing State. Also, there are special provisions 
on non-execution of the EAW. If compared to the traditional processes of extradition between 
Member States, the EAW has a limited amount of grounds for a refusal to surrender.
168
 
 
As for the surrender procedure, there are four groups that the grounds for non-execution of the 
EAW can be divided into. 
 
First there is the mandatory non-execution. There are three cases in which the judicial authority that 
is executing shall refuse to execute the EAW: ―amnesty; the requested person has been finally 
judged by a Member State in respect of the same acts; and the requested person may not, owing to 
his or her age, be held criminally responsible for the act(s) on which the EAW is based.‖169     
 
Next there is the optional non-execution. The executing judicial authority can refuse to execute the 
EAW in case of: the act on which the European arrest warrant is based on does not constitute an 
offence under the law of the executing Member State, that is to say, the absence of dual criminality; 
the individual who is subject to the EAW is being prosecuted in the executing Member State for the 
same act on which the EAW is based on; executing judicial authorities have decided not to 
prosecute for the offence on which the EAW is based or to halt proceedings, or there is final 
judgement that has been passed; the criminal prosecution or punishment of the individual is statute-
barred; the individual has been finally judged by a third State concerning the same acts; the 
executing State takes upon itself to execute the sentence or detention order; the lack of 
jurisdiction.
170
 
 
For the way the title of the Article 4 (‗Grounds for optional non-execution of the European arrest 
warrant‘) of the Framework Decision on the EAW is written, it seems clear ―that it is not the 
implementation of those grounds by the Member States which is optional but rather the execution of 
the European arrest warrant, which is thus left to the discretion of the national judicial 
authorities.‖171 
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Thirdly there is decisions in absentia. Due to the necessity to have clear and common solutions 
define the grounds for refusal and the discretion left to the executing authority, the Framework 
Decision  2009/299/JHA was adopted.
172
 As for the EAW, as amended by the Framework Decision 
2009/299/JHA, the executing judicial authority can refuse to execute the EAW if the person did not 
appear in person at the trial resulting in the decision.
173
 
 
On top of mandatory and optional grounds of non-execution of the EAW, there are special 
situations. The Framework Decision on the EAW precludes decisions based on political expediency. 
Also, in the Framework Decision on the EAW the possibility of infringing human rights has been 
precluded.
174
   
 
 
3.4 Defining and categorising crimes in the European Union     
 
 
3.4.1 Categories of offences in the list of 32 offences 
 
 
Some of the categories in the list of 32 offences are easy to identify as criminal offences and as such 
they share common requirements for their commission in the Member States. Other categories on 
the other hand are more vague. To better approach the matter it is reasonable to divide the crimes 
into four categories taking into account the title and the elements of the crime.
175
 
 
In the first group are included ―the offences with the same title and and containing almost the same 
elements of crime.‖ These offences can be thought as typical in all Member States. Murder can be 
given as an example of such an offence. Another example would be kidnapping. In principle there is 
no problem in the interpretation of these offences.
176
 
 
In the second group are included ―the offences with a similar title, however containing the almost 
same elements of crime.‖ There is a possibility that these are affected by harmonisation at the EU 
level. Like in the first group, these too can be considered as typical in all Member States. Among 
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these offences are for example: human trafficking, drug trafficking, money laundering, computer 
crime, cyber crime, high tech crime and virtual crime. Like in the first group there is in principle no 
problem in the interpretation of these offences.
177
 
 
Within the third group belong offences that have identical title however containing different 
elements of crime. Examples of these are rape and fraud. And in the fourth group there are unknown 
offences for some EU Member States. Pursuant to the principle nullum crimen sine lege
178
, a 
domestic law is not applicable or it is silent.
179
 
 
 
3.4.2 Crimes not subject to harmonisation 
 
 
There are crimes that have not been harmonised in the list of 32 offences, and to this group belong, 
for example, the following: theft, organised or armed robbery, arson, ―trafficking offences‖ except 
the ones related to drugs. With most of these crimes there are no real definitional problems, but 
some issues could rise concerning two groups of offences: Murder and rape, and the other being 
―special‖ group that includes xenophobia and racism, extortion and racketeering, sabotage and 
trafficking in stolen vehicles and swindling. The latter has erected some obstacles to a functioning 
EAW.
180
 
 
As murder and rape are considered to be crimes against the person, they have some features that 
change depending on the legal system in which they are perceived. In most cases this does not pose 
a huge problem. 
 
In case of murder, the first difference to be pointed out is that most legal systems have at least two 
forms of homicide. The act is distinguished between these forms of homicide. How systems 
categorize the acts changes depending on the system. The penalties also differ considerably 
depending on the system. Another difference is in the fact that certain acts are not fitted under the 
definition of murder by some States. Abortion and euthanasia are examples of such acts. The 
question of whether these acts should be criminalised by States or not is topical and pervades many 
extra-legal fields. These matters were approached and discussed by the drafters of the EAW, but the 
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43 
problems still persist.
181
 If a doctor performs euthanasia in a State where it is legal, should he or she 
be surrendered by that State in case an EAW is issued? 
 
Suffice to say, as far as these types of acts are concerned, the effectiveness of the EAW should be 
questioned. This is not only due to the legal matters, but also because the issues are important in a 
societal context as a whole. 
 
The second example was rape. How different States define rape has varied a lot during the years. 
This reflects the changing attitudes and policies. If a distinction is to be drawn, it could be done 
between consent-based and force-based definitions. The difference, in practical terms, lies in 
required evidence. This uncertainty surrounding the definition of rape is enforced at an international 
level, where the issue is only raised in connection with war crimes, genocide or crimes against 
humanity.
182
 
 
The trend, however, in European countries seems to be towards consent-based definitions. This 
view is enhanced by the ECtHR in MC v. Bulgaria. In the case the court found that States have a 
positive duty to consider all non-consensual sexual acts as crimes. Even if there is no physical 
resistance by the victim, or there is no proof of such resistance.
183
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusions 
 
 
There seems to be no question that the EAW is a very important instrument for cooperation in 
criminal matters within the union. Prosecuting and convicting criminal has been made easier. When 
looking from the perspective of how effective the EAW is, it is quite clear the situation is much 
better than when traditional forms of extraction were used.  
 
Dual criminality and problems arising from the partial removal of it is interesting. It seems that 
there was a haste to push the EAW forward thus leaving certain elements and differences of national 
legal systems aside. A fight against terrorism seems to be the issue that led the EU to bring about 
the EAW in such a fast manner. That is why many of the crimes from which dual criminality is 
removed are related to terrorism and organized crime. 
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4. Issues with fundamental rights and the EAW 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
The European Commission and the European Council have been active bringing up the necessity to  
ensure human- and fundamental rights when implementing the EAW. They have done so ever since  
EAW became part of the mutual recognition agenda.
184
 
 
Even if the obligations brought about by the Framework Decision on the EAW concern Member 
States mostly on procedural aspects, that is not indicative of a failure of the legislature to consider  
fundamental and human rights when enacting the Framework decision.
185
       
 
Even if the necessity of the protection of the fundamental rights is recognised and followed by most 
courts, the amount of consideration given is thought to be not enough by many academics and 
practitioners. There is a warning in the preamble that the implementation of the EAW may be 
suspended if there is a persistent and serious breach of Article 6(1).
186
 The aforementioned Article 
refers to the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the rights the Charter contains. The rights which 
are mentioned in the Charter, as long as they are the same as rights included in ECHR, are assumed 
to have the same meaning and scope as them.
187
 
 
Despite the fact that the Charter of Fundamental Rights presents a wider array of protected rights 
than any other document, they are invariably based on other documents that came before. Many 
rights are included from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms adopted by the Council of Europe.
188
 
 
As for the EAW itself, an argument is made by the Court of Justice in the case C-168/13 of Jeremy 
F: The entire surrender procedure between Member States is carried out under judicial supervision.  
From that it can be deduced the provisions of the Framework Decision already provide a procedure 
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that is in line with the requirements of Article 47 of the EU Charter.
189
     
 
The preamble to the Framework Decision on the EAW does not however have binding value and it 
does not devote much thought on the fundamental rights. Also, the preamble has two fundamental 
rights safeguards: ―First, the Framework Decision should be interpreted in the sense that refusal of 
surrender is always permitted when it can be proved that an EAW has been issued for the purpose of 
prosecuting or punishing an individual on discriminatory grounds. Second, removal, expulsion or 
extradition of an individual to a state where he may be subject to the death penalty, torture or other 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment should be forbidden.
190
 
 
The surrender proceeding is by no means perfect and this observation has been done by many 
different entities: EU Member States, European and national parliamentarians, groups from civil 
society and individual citizens have all in their way brought up the effect EAW especially has on 
fundamental rights.
191
 
 
 
4.2 Interlacing fundamental rights provisions 
 
 
When considering the actual application of the EAW, it is natural to refer to the jurisprudence of the  
ECtHR as far as extradition law goes. European countries have had their approach shaped by the 
ECtHR not only within the borders of Europe, but also towards third countries. Soering is probably 
the most influential case in this area. The carrying idea in Soering decision is that if and when a 
subject is surrendered to a State where he or she might be subjected to torture or inhumane 
treatment, the responsibility of the surrendering State would be engaged under Article 3 ECHR. 
Also, Soering brings up, the responsibility of the State could also be engaged under Article 6 
ECHR, which deals with flagrant denial of the right to a fair trial.
192
 
 
When it comes to the EAW specifically, international human rights provisions are not the only 
normative source that should be considered. EU law has its important role to play. 
 
The Framework Decision on the EAW sets out many obligations to the executing State. To bring up 
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some: ―the obligation to refuse surrender in some specific cases; the converse obligation to 
surrender without checking double criminality (again in some specific cases); and procedural 
obligations applying in the surrender stages.‖ First, Articles 3 and 4 of the Framework Decision on 
the EAW contain a list of grounds which, when relevant, lead the executing state in a situation 
where it must or it may deny surrender. These grounds correspond to the ones often found in 
extradition treaties. Secondly, the requirement of double criminality is a feature of the EAW that 
stands out. This has been discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4.4 of this paper. Thirdly, the person 
who is requested has a right to be heard by a judicial entity, following the law of the executing state. 
This has also been discussed more thoroughly in chapter 4.4 of this chapter.
193
    
 
The EAW could be seen as an interesting multi-level interaction between many different sources, 
such as: provisions of the ECHR, the Charter, TEU/TFEU and national law. The interaction between  
the ECHR and the Charter is quite relevant when considering the potential accession of the EU to 
the ECHR. Although, when compared with the ECHR, the Charter could have added value.
194
 
 
 
4.3 Changing approach of the Court of Justice 
 
 
4.3.1 Age of Enforcement    
 
 
4.3.1.1 Case Radu 
 
 
First, it is paramount we look at 2 cases that differentiate between the different ages of the Court of 
Justice when it comes to the EAW: Radu and Melloni 
 
On 29
th
 January 2013, the Court delivered its judgement in the Radu case. The Court was asked to 
interpret the Framework Decision on the EAW in light of the Charter and the ECHR. This 
judgement was expected to open a more human rights-positive interpretation of the EAW. But this 
was not to be.
195
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Radu was about EAWs against a Romanian national who stated that his defence rights had been 
violated. The national court asked about the issue of deprivation of liberty of the requested person, 
as part of the procedure which leads to the execution of the EAW. Because this constitutes as an 
interference of right to liberty and security of a person, the Court was asked whether this was 
actually necessary and proportionate to fulfill the objective of a democratic society. Also, the 
national court inquired if the execution of the EAW can be refused in cases where it leads to 
infringements of Articles 5 and 6 of the ECHR or Articles 6, 48 and 52 CFREU. An issue was also 
raised concerning the interpretation of the EAW in light of the Article 6 TEU and the Treaty of 
Lisbon and if the ECHR and the Charter form a part of the primary law. 
196
 
 
On the matter of the Charter and the ECHR being part of the primary law, the Advocate General 
Sharpston made a claim that the rights emanating from the Charter constitute part of the primary 
law and the rights emanating from the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law.
197
  
 
The Advocate General, in this case, brought up the ECtHR, which espoused an approach that the 
surrender can be refused, but only in case of a flagrant denial of the right to fair trial in the 
requested country, or where a potential breach is established beyond reasonable doubt. The 
Advocate General thought the concept of ―flagrant‖ to be somewhat vague. In her suggestion the 
execution of the EAW could be refused on fundamental rights grounds, but this could only be done 
when the deficiencies in the trial process are so fundamental as to destroy its fairness. Also, 
breaches that are remediable do not constitute as a right to refuse transfer of the requested person to 
the Member State where these rights are at a risk. 
198
 
   
The Advocate General was of the opinion that the deprivation of liberty and forcible surrender of 
the requested person constitutes an infringement with the requested person´s right to liberty for the 
purposes of Article 5 of the Convention and Article 6 of the Charter. Detention, as such, should not 
be arbitrary. For the detention to not be arbitrary, it should be carried out in good faith.
199
  
 
The Court, in its decision, stated that the EAW was brought about so as to simplify extradition and 
that it was based on mutual recognition. The states are expected to have mutual trust and because of 
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that an EAW request should be followed.
200
 The Court seemed to accept that the Charter is 
considered primary law, but it also exclaimed that the upholding of rights in Articles 47 and 48 of 
the Charter does not necessitate the executing authority to be allowed to refuse the EAW.
201
   
 
The Court, in a sense, remained loyal to the instrument and its aspirations when it comes to grounds 
for refusal. It did not leave much room for interpretation. It argued that if the requested person is to 
be heard by the issuing authorities, it could endanger the very system of surrender and prevent the 
area of freedom, security and justice taking place. This is so because the arrest warrant must have 
certain element of surprise, especially to stop the requested person from escaping.
202
  
 
As for the matter of person´s liberty following the process of arrest being too much in interference 
with the right to liberty and security, the Court simply stated that it is related to the debate on 
defence rights. The matter, according to the Court, did not require any special attention.
203
 
 
The ruling did not follow the Advocate General´s recommendation. On top of that the Court 
contradicted itself on its previous ruling in the N.S case, where it stated: ―In the light of those 
factors, the answer to the questions referred is that European Union law precludes the application of 
a conclusive presumption that the Member State which Article 3(1) of Regulation No 343/2003 
indicates as responsible observes the fundamental rights of the European Union.‖204 In Radu, the 
Court based their requirement of Member States to have mutual trust on this conclusive 
presumption.    
 
The Court´s statement, that if the requested person was to be heard by the issuing authority the 
whole system would falter, is interesting. The system is based on an idea that the requested person 
is surprised before he or she can escape. This, I think, goes to some extent against the principle of 
presumption of innocence found in the Article 48 of the Charter and 6(2) ECHR.     
 
It seems that the judgement of the Court was somewhat bland. The Court was probably reluctant to 
challenge the foundation of the EAW, namely the principle of mutual recognition and the principle 
of mutual trust. Also, the court might have been considering how dire and vast the effects of a more 
human-rights friendly decision could be. 
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4.3.1.2 Case Melloni 
 
 
Melloni case was about a Spanish citizen who had been convicted in absentia in Italy. Italy issued a 
EAW demanding that Spain surrenders Melloni. The first question posed before the Court was 
whether Article 4a(1)(a) and (b) prevented the executing judicial authority from making the 
requested person subject to the possibility for the individual who is concerned to apply for a retrial 
in the issuing Member State. Concerning this matter, the Advocate General found that the 
aforementioned Articles allowed the judge to deny the execution, if the judgement was done in 
absentia as it was in this case. Also, in those same rules there are exceptions, which make it so that 
the execution cannot be refused. In this case Melloni belonged to one of those exceptions, which 
was in Article 4a(1)(b).
205
   
 
The second question was about whether the interpretation of Article 4a(1) of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW was in conformity with Articles 47 and 48 CFREU. The Court referred to the 
ECtHR´s case law and stressed that, even if the right of the accused to be present at his or her trial is 
an important part of the right to a fair trial, that right is by no means absolute.
206
 The accused may 
be represented by a lawyer. If he or she so wills, the right to attend the trial can be waived 
altogether. If this decision made is by his or her own free and unequivocal choice, he or she is not 
entitled to a retrial. As such, the Advocate General stated that Article 4a(1) is fully consistent with 
that case law. The Advocate General also said that this strikes a balance between fundamental rights 
protection and facilitation of legal cooperation in criminal matters, and diverging levels of national 
protection are not possible due to the consensus Member States share on the text of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW.
207
   
 
Third, and the most crucial question, asked from the Court: is there any leeway for the executing 
State to grant more extensive fundamental rights to the individual than the ones already afforded by 
EU law, based on Article 53 of the EU Charter.
208
 Article 53 of the EU Charter says: ―Nothing in 
this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law 
and by international agreements to which the Union, the Community or all the Member States are 
party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
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Freedoms, and by the Member States'' constitutions.‖209 From this stems the question if Article 53 
EU Charter allows Member States to go further than the rights that are granted by the EU law if 
their constitutions demand that they do. Also if they are required to, when their constitutions so 
demand, to give priority to national law. 
 
The Court did not hesitate in its answer: interpretation like that would undermine the effectiveness 
of EU law and be in violation with the primacy of EU law. If Spain, in this case, would be allowed 
to follow the requirements of its national constitution, persons who are sentenced in absentia could 
not be surrendered, unless the issuing State is offering a retrial. Whenever EU harmonises the 
fundamental rights in one area in an exhaustive way, the Member States lose the right to demand 
higher standards of procedural safeguards, even if this demand has its basis in the national 
constitution. The decision EU makes in these cases relies on the necessity to find a level of 
fundamental rights protection, which does not impede the effectiveness of EU law and mutual 
cooperation any more than necessary.
210
 
 
It was submitted that the decision of the Court in Melloni did not close all possibilities for Member 
States to apply higher fundamental rights standards in cases where Union law and the Charter are 
applicable.
211
 The Advocate General gave his opinion on the matter and made a helpful distinction 
between situations in which there is a common definition of the degree of protection decided at an 
European level to be given to a certain right and situations in which this has not occurred.
212
 In the 
latter of the aforementioned situations, the Advocate General states that: ―On the other hand, in the 
second case, the Member States have more room for manoeuvre in applying, within the scope of 
European Union law, the level of protection for fundamental rights which they wish to guarantee 
within the national legal order, provided that that level of protection may be reconciled with the 
proper implementation of European Union law and does not infringe other fundamental rights 
protected under European Union law.‖213  There is no more of discussion on the matter in the 
Advocate General´s opinion, as this case did not fall within the scope of this situation. Even then, 
the possibility that a situation in which Member States had more leeway on deciding how to 
implement Union law could be covered. The Court did not accept nor did it reject the Advocate 
General´s approach.
214
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Considering the context of the ending of last paragraph, Article 4(2) TEU should be brought up. It 
states that the Union is expected to respect its Member States identities that are inherent in their 
fundamental structures, constitutional and political. The Spanish Tribunal Constitucional did not 
rely on this provision in its reference order. The judgement also does not mention Article 4(2) TEU. 
As for the Spanish constitutional case law on the right to fair trial being part of the country´s 
national identity, the question was brought up during the hearing and then rebutted by the Spanish 
agent before the Court.
215
The matter was also brought up by the Advocate General, who stated that 
there is a possibility for Member States to challenge the validity of Union secondary law based on 
Article 4(2). The Advocate General, however, did not think that the constitutional identity of Spain 
was at stake in the present case.
216
  
 
These two judgements, Radu and Melloni, are generally seen as the pinnacles of the Court´s 
approach to the Framework Decision on the EAW relying mostly on enforcement purposes. The 
need to balance between fundamental rights and the need for surrender was left in the background 
and little heed was paid to this question. In these cases the Court´s approach was one where law 
enforcement was clearly more highlighted than individual rights. After these rulings, which could 
be seen as a sort of turning point, the Court has shifted its focus more towards individual rights.
217
 
 
It seems that, considering the Court´s shifting interest towards individual rights, this case might 
have been a part of a sort of wake-up call, which turned the tide. But then again, when considering 
the concern the Court had at the time to uphold primacy and uniformity of EU law, the result itself 
is not that surprising.  
 
 
4.3.2 Towards a more individual-rights-emphasizing age 
 
 
4.3.2.1 Case Jeremy F 
 
 
Not long after the Melloni case, the court was tasked to rule on the possibility for a Member State to 
provide for an appeal against the resolution to execute an EAW and the possible consequences for 
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not complying with the time-limits for the recognition of the EAW as set by the Framework 
Decision.
218
 
 
In Jeremy F the Court was tasked with the question if Articles 27(4) and 28(3)(c) would prevent 
Member States from allowing an appeal with suspensive effects against a resolution to execute an 
EAW, or a resolution that would give consent to an extension of the warrant or to an onward 
surrender to a Member State that is different than the one that issued the EAW.
219
 
 
At its approach, the court considered Article 17. Article 17 is about general time-limits and 
procedure when deciding to execute the EAW. The possibility of even having a right to appeal 
follows from the expression, implicitly but necessarily, ―final decision‖. This expression can be 
found in Article 17(2) (3) and (5) of the Framework Decision. As there are no explicit contrary 
provisions, the Member States can introduce an appeal with suspensive effects against decisions 
that have relation to an EAW. Also, Article 17 sets in place time-limits for the execution and 
decision on the EAW. Any appeals with suspensive effects introduced against decisions that have 
relation to an EAW cannot disregard these limits.
220
 
 
Next the Court approached the question about the Articles 27(4) and 28(3)(c). These Articles deal 
with prosecution for other offences and onward surrender. There are time-limits set for the decision 
that is to be made by the executing judge. These Articles come into place instead of Article 17 when 
the person has already been surrendered. The executing judge already has certain amount of 
information which gives him or her the possibility of making an informed decision. The 
aforementioned ―final decision‖ is not mentioned in Articles 27(4) or 28(3)(c). Even if this was the 
case, the Court found that nothing in the Framework Decision prevented the executing judge from 
allowing an appeal.
221
 
 
To bolster its case, the Court brought up Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW, 
which states that fundamental rights must remain as they are when it comes to context of EAW 
procedures.
222
 
 
The Court also stated that it would go against the logic of the Framework Decision on the EAW to 
allow longer periods for adoption of a final decision under Articles 27(4) and 28(3)(c) than are 
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allowed in Article 17. As the objective is to accelerate surrender procedures, it would be redundant 
to make a difference between Article 17 and Articles 27(4) and 28(3)(c).
223
 
 
As was brought up in Melloni, it has been argued that in cases where EU law has not been 
harmonized the constitutional standards will become more applicable.  
 
The ruling of the case Jeremy F has been considered as an instance where such an approach was 
taken. In the case of Jeremy F, the Court concluded that the Framework Decision on the EAW, 
amended by the Framework Decision on judgements in absentia, did not prevent Member States 
from introducing appeals with suspensive effect. Appeals made in such way were still expected to 
comply with the time limits set out in the Framework Decision on the EAW. The Court stated that 
the fact that there is no provision concerning the possibility of bringing an appeal with suspensive 
effect against a decision to execute the EAW is not an indication that the Framework Decision on 
the EAW prevents the Member State from making such an appeal or requires them to do so.
224
    
 
Jeremy F, however, should be separated from Melloni. In Melloni the question was about the 
possibility of using fundamental rights as grounds to refuse a mutual recognition request. Jeremy F, 
on the other hand, did not pose a fundamental challenge on the mutual recognition system. The 
question, rather, in Jeremy F was a sort of meta-question, which concerned the specific procedural 
rules that applied in the process of the execution of the Warrant. And even in this case, the Member 
States are left with limited discretion when it comes to the matter of protecting fundamental rights. 
The discretion is restricted by the deadlines that the mutual recognition instruments set; the aim of 
the instruments is to achieve a wanted speed that is linked to the perceived efficiency of the 
system.
225
     
 
What are essentially intergovernmental choices gain an undue weight because of the Courts 
deferential approach. The Court´s emphasis on upholding the validity of harmonized EU secondary 
law over primary constitutional law on human rights, on the national level and also on the EU level, 
is a dire challenge on fundamental rights protection.
226
 
 
The case Jeremy F, despite not being a huge step towards more fundamental rights friendly 
approach, does still open the door for a more individual-rights centered judgements. As shown there 
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are problems with the interpretation that might be drawn from Jeremy F that in cases where the EU 
law has not been harmonized the national constitutional standards become more applicable. Speed 
and efficiency of the EAW as a mutual recognition instrument is paramount. Still, the fact that 
Jeremy F has been considered such a case in which constitutional standards are given value still 
holds merit and should not be disregarded. 
 
 
4.3.2.2 Case Lanigan 
 
 
In Lanigan the issue was about time-limits in Article 17 approached in light of Article 15. The 
question raised, and presented to the Court, was: What are the effects in case a Member State fails 
to abide by those limits? If a time limit is exceeded, does it form a right to the individual who is 
released?
227
 
 
The Court found that nothing in the Framework Decision on the EAW prevents the judge, who is 
executing, from holding the person in custody even if the time-limits dictated in Article 17 have 
expired.
228
 The Court stated that the delays, no matter how serious, would only have the effect of 
postponing the execution of the EAW as Member States could issue a second EAW if they wanted. 
This view is espoused in paragraph 37 of the judgement: ―Therefore, in the light, first, of the central 
function of the obligation to execute the European arrest warrant in the system put in place by the 
Framework Decision and, second, of the absence of any explicit indication therein as to a limitation 
of the temporal validity of that obligation, the rule set out in Article 15(1) of the Framework 
Decision cannot be interpreted as meaning that, once the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the 
Framework Decision have expired, the executing judicial authority is no longer able to adopt the 
decision on the execution of the European arrest warrant or that the executing Member State is no 
longer required to carry out the execution procedure in that regard.‖229  
 
On the matter of rights of Lanigan upon the expiration of the time-limits, the Court ruled that even 
when Article 23(5) of the Framework Decision states that the executing State will release the 
individual if he or she is not surrendered within those time-limits that follow the decision to execute 
the EAW, such forcing language was not found in Articles 15 and 17 of the Framework Decision. 
As such, there was no necessity to release Lanigan even when the execution of the EAW had been 
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delayed.
230
   
 
The Court justified the decision that there was no necessity to release Lanigan in paragraph 51 of 
the judgement. In the aforementioned paragraph the Court relies on Article 26(1) of the Framework 
Decision. According to the Court: ―[T]he issuing Member State is to deduct all periods of detention 
arising from the execution of a European arrest warrant from the total period of detention to be 
served in that State, thereby ensuring that all periods of detention, even those resulting from 
possibly being held in custody after the time-limits stipulated in Article 17 of the Framework 
Decision have expired, will duly be taken into account if a custodial sentence is executed in the 
issuing Member State.‖231   
 
Even so, the Court also stated that the Article 1(3) of the Framework decision on the EAW must be 
seen adjacent and in compliance with the Charter, especially Articles 6 and 52 of it. The executing 
judge should hold the individual who is concerned in detention only the time that execution 
procedures are carried out with due diligence and the duration of these procedures is not any longer 
than necessary. This being so, because any limitations to liberty should be carried out with principle 
of proportionality in mind.
232
   
 
The most remarkable aspect of the ruling, in my opinion, is that the Court seems to give 
consideration to ECHR´s decisions in Quinn v France and Gallardo Sanchez v Italy. The cases were 
concerned with right to liberty. Based on these cases the Court stated that the amount of time person 
spends in detention could only be as much as it takes time to carry out the procedure for the 
execution of the European arrest warrant in a sufficiently diligent manner and as long as the 
duration of the custody is not excessive.
233
 
 
The fact still remains that because there was no repercussion deemed in case Article 17 of the EAW 
time-limits were not followed, the whole Article 17 of the EAW has simply been a guideline 
without any power to back it up.  
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4.3.2.3 Joined cases Aranyosi and Căldăraru 
 
 
The Court continued towards a more fundamental rights oriented approach, still keeping the original 
intent of the EAW in mind. In Aranyosi and Căldăraru the Court had a more balanced approach 
than before. In the case Court had to deal with a question of a possible refusal to execute the EAW 
due to there being a risk of inhumane treatment in the issuing Members States, in this case Romania 
and Hungary, because of their poor detention conditions.
234
 
 
The Higher Regional Court of Bremen referred two cases, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, that were 
nearly identical to the CJEU. The referrals were done under Article 267 TFEU and they were 
concerned about the interpretation of Articles 1(3), 5 and 6(1) of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW.
235
   
 
First there are the facts of the cases. An EAW was issued for Mr. Aranyosi by the Hungarian District 
Court of Miskolc for the surrender of the individual to the Hungarian judicial authorities for the 
purposes of prosecution. As for Mr. Căldăraru, the Romanian Court of the First Instance of Făgăraș 
issued an EAW for the purposes of executing a prison sentence for driving without a license. The 
defendants were arrested in Bremen and neither of them consented to the surrender. The conditions 
of the detention in some of the Hungarian and Romanian prisons concerned the General Prosecutor 
of Bremen. The General Prosecutor of Bremen asked for some reassurance from the issuing judicial 
authorities that the facilities in which the requested persons would be held in were sufficient. The 
Hungarian Court stated that the question was irrelevant as Hungarian court system had other 
enforcement measures other than deprivation of liberty. The Romanian Court had not yet decided on 
the detention facility for Mr. Căldăraru.236      
 
The defendants, Aranyosi and Căldăraru, asked that surrender be rejected as there was no possibility 
to check the conditions in prisons, taking into account that the national courts did not specify the 
prisons in which the requested persons would be held. The General Prosecutor of Bremen, 
meanwhile, asked that the request to surrender the requested persons was to be declared legal by the 
German court.
237
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The Higher Regional Court of Bremen considered the requests of Hungary and Romania to be in 
compliance with the formal conditions set in German implementing measure of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW. The criminal offences the requested persons were suspected of were 
punishable by both the issuing Member States and German Law. The German court stated also that 
the surrender might be declared illegal if it went against Article 73 of the German Implementing 
Law. According to the aforementioned law judicial surrender cannot go against the imperative 
principles of the German legal order and the principles set in Article 6 TEU.
238
 The information that 
was given to the German court made it think that there was a chance that the requested persons 
might be subjected to detention conditions that were in violation of Article 3 ECHR and the general 
principles of EU law preserved in Article 6 TEU.
239
 
 
The German court was unable to decide, in both Aranyosi and Căldăraru, whether surrender to 
Hungary and Romania respectively was allowed or not based on Article 1(3) of the Framework De-
cision on the EAW.
240
 The first question the Higher Regional Court of Bremen referred was: ―Is 
Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision to be interpreted as meaning that a request for surrender for 
the purposes of prosecution is inadmissible where there are strong indications that detention condi-
tions in the issuing Member State infringe the fundamental rights of the person concerned and the 
fundamental legal principles as enshrined in Article 6 TEU, or is it to be interpreted as meaning 
that, in such circumstances, the executing Member State can or must make the decision on the ad-
missibility of the request for surrender conditional upon assurances that detention conditions are 
compliant? To that end, can or must the executing Member State lay down specific minimum re-
quirements applicable to the detention conditions in respect of which an assurance is sought?‖ The 
second question referred was: ―Are Articles 5 and 6(1) of the Framework Decision to be interpreted 
as meaning that the issuing judicial authority is also entitled to give assurances that detention condi-
tions are compliant, or do assurances in this regard remain subject to the domestic rules of compe-
tence in the issuing Member State?‖241 
  
The Advocate General´s opinion is looked at next. The Advocate General Bot begun his quite a long 
opinion by stating that the preliminary reference requires the Court to balance the fundamental 
rights of the person to be surrendered against the EU´s goal to create an AFSJ.
242
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Before the main question the Advocate General Bot brought up some preliminary observations 
about the risks and difficulties that transposing the principles developed in CEAS to system 
particularly specific to the EAW would bring about. In N.S and others the Court stated that a 
Member State is not obligated to transfer an asylum seeker to the Member State processing him or 
her in cases where there are systemic deficiencies in the asylum process and where the reception 
conditions might possibly expose the asylum seeker to such inhuman or degrading treatment as is 
enshrined in Article 4 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
243
   
 
The Advocate General was of the opinion that an analogy between the N.S and others and the joined 
cases discussed here was not possible. First, the relevant part of the N.S and other is the principle 
under which no one can be removed, expelled or extradited to a State where that person could be 
sentenced to a death penalty, torture, degrading or inhuman treatment. This principle comes from 
Article 19(2) EU Charter and Article 3 ECHR. Textual analysis of the Recital 13 of the preamble of 
the Framework Decision to the EAW shows that this principle was left out from the Framework 
Decision on the EAW. Second, CEAS and EAW aim towards different objectives, have different 
levels of harmonization and are structured differently, although they both contribute towards 
AFSJ.
244
 
 
This approach, of differentiating between CEAS and the Framework Decision on the EAW, seems 
to not give enough attention to the importance of the Treaty of Lisbon when it comes to creating the 
AFSJ. There is truth to the fact that the area of asylum is more harmonized than the area of criminal 
cooperation and most of the older secondary EU law instruments concerning criminal cooperation 
are lacking focus on fundamental rights. Even so, they are both part of an overarching integrated 
policy area, AFSJ, and they share common objectives and principles. The molding of AFSJ must 
take fundamental rights into account and the principle of mutual recognition is the foundation of 
civil cooperation, criminal cooperation and asylum policy.
245
 The principle of mutual recognition is 
a constitutional principle that pervades the AFSJ. The principle of mutual recognition is based on 
mutual trust.
246
    
 
As the Advocate General starts to look for balance he begins by considering if Article 1(3) of the 
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Framework Decision on the EAW constitutes as a refusal of an EAW. The Advocate General rejects 
this possibility for three reasons.
247
 First, to consider Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW as grounds for non-execution would be against the intention of the wording of the Article, 
which does not convey a non-execution ground but rather it conveys the principle of mutual trust. 
That is why Article 1(3) is merely a reminder that the Member States should respect fundamental 
rights.
248
 Second, an interpretation that would allow a whole new non-execution ground to be 
created goes against EU legislator´s intent of forging a surrender system in which there are 
exhaustively enumerated grounds for non-recognition. As such, in addition to the grounds given in 
Articles 3, 4 and 4a of the Framework Decision on the EAW, the surrender can be suspended or 
removal, expulsion or extradition can be prohibited only if there are exceptional situations 
mentioned and described in Recitals (10) and (13).
249
 Third, if Article (3) of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW would give grounds for non-execution would wound mutual trust and would 
render the principle of mutual recognition useless.
250
 The Advocate General also cited the Melloni 
case as a reminder that mutual trust and the principle of mutual recognition are of such priority that 
they can make the Member States lower their higher standards of fundamental rights protection in 
cases where these principles could be in danger.
251
  
 
One more practical argument against the Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW 
containing grounds for non-execution, that was not listed in the three arguments mentioned before, 
was brought up by the Advocate General. Due to overcrowding of prisons, the acceptance of Article 
1(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW containing grounds for non-execution would halt the 
working of the EAW, because there would be so many cases where executing Member States would 
refuse surrendering requested person due to conditions in issuing Member States prisons.
252
 
Nevertheless, the executing authority must take into account, after it has exchanged information 
with the issuing authority, if the requested person would be forced into detention in which the 
conditions are disproportionate.
253
  
 
The Advocate General seems to tip the balance in favor of the principles of mutual recognition and 
mutual trust at the cost of protection of fundamental rights of the requested person. Fundamental 
rights have become quintessential to the EU´s constitutional order. This has been taken into account 
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by the Court. For example, in case N.S and others, the Court brought to an end to the negative 
mutual recognition in the asylum area, barring some exceptional circumstances. The Advocate 
General seems to muddy the waters between hierarchically superior fundamental rights that are part 
of EU primary law and at the epicenter of EU values, and, on the other hand, a secondary legislation 
adopted in different times.
254
 
 
Curious is also the decision of the Advocate General to bring up Melloni as an example of how the 
principle of mutual recognition can overshadow higher standard of fundamental rights protection in 
Member States. The situation is different. In Melloni the question was about how the supremacy of 
EU law, manifested in the form of mutual recognition, overcame national constitutional standards. 
In the case at hand the German Court and the German implementing legislation also brought up 
human rights standards in Article 6 TEU. As such, the question is about the EU standards of 
fundamental rights protection which stand at an equal ground hierarchically, if not a bit higher, than 
the principle of mutual recognition.
255
  
 
Article 1(3) of the Framework Decision on the EAW does not constitute a ground for non-
execution, but an alternative to the creation of the AFSJ and the protection of the fundamental rights 
can be found. The Advocate General Bot considers the Union principle of proportionality a solution. 
According to the principle of proportionality, the judicial authority is required to individualize the 
punishment. This individualization of punishment encompasses the idea that when an individual is 
sentenced to a custodial sentence, the judge must take into account the surrounding circumstances 
in which the sentence is to be executed and the possible weight of the circumstances. The 
circumstances of detention is one of the circumstances the judge should take into account.
256
 
 
The issuing judicial authority is at first obliged to ensure that the detention of the surrendered 
person and the condition thereof is proportional. The executing judicial authority is a safety net, in 
case the issuing judicial authority is unable to fulfill its obligation. If the executing judicial 
authority, after looking at all the available information, determines that the detention in the issuing 
Member State is not sufficient, it must consider if in the individual case the surrendered person 
would be subjected to disproportionally grave detention conditions.
257
 
 
It is reasonable to wonder if the fact that the Advocate General brought up proportionality might 
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raise more issues than it solves. It is also reasonable to question whether this discussion about 
proportionality actually brings any answers to the questions posed by the German court. The Court, 
after all, decided not to take a stance on this complicated debate.
258
  
 
The Advocate General´s opinion ends with an appeal to the Court that it would act as a sort of 
human rights court. A critique is also applied to both the Member States and the institution of EU 
because they have not been effective enough in ensuring proper application of EU detention 
standards across the Union.
259
   
 
The Court was reliant on the Article 1(3), which states that the Framework Decision on the EAW 
does not cause the Member States to have to alter their obligation to respect fundamental rights. 
Article 1(3) demands that Article 4 CFREU be followed, and in there is a prohibition of inhumane 
and degrading treatment. The decision on the surrender can only be done when there is sufficient 
information excluding the possibility of inhumane treatment. This possible risk must be checked 
and, in reasonable time, discounted. If this cannot be done, the executing judge has to decide 
whether to bring the surrender procedure to an end or not.
260
 
 
The Court came up with a two-step test. In the first step the executing authority is expected to rely 
on accurate, reliable, objective and duly updated information on the detention conditions in the 
issuing Member State, which provides it with facts about the systemic or general failures, or touch 
upon certain groups of people, or certain detention facilities. In the second step the executing 
authority must make certain that in the specific case the requested person is in reality facing such a 
real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment.
261
 In light of this, the executing authority is required to 
request the judicial authority in the issuing Member State to provide more information on the 
detention conditions of the facility in which the requested person is to be held. This request is done 
under Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision on the EAW.
262
  
 
The judgement gives light to a view that the requirement to expect another Member State to give 
sufficient fundamental rights protection is not, as the older case law would suggest, unconditional. 
The result of this judgement is that the executing Member State´s judicial authorities are not always 
required to execute arrest warrant in case the exhaustively enumerated non-execution grounds stated 
in Articles 3, 4 and 4a do not apply. This conclusion that the presumption of mutual trust is not 
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inviolable is remarkable considering the Court´s previous case law on the matter. There is no doubt 
that in its previous case law the Court had favored an effective surrender of requested persons based 
on the principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust.
263
   
 
At the same time, the individual who is concerned should be kept in custody only the time that is 
necessary. The duration of the detention should not be excessive, as is stated in Article 52(1) of the 
charter outlining the requirement of proportionality.
264
 
 
The Court ruled that a Member State may postpone execution of an arrest warrant in case it has 
solid, objective and up-to-date information showing that the issuing Member State has not 
implemented a sufficient level of fundamental rights protection that is set out in the Framework 
Decision on the EAW. The Court also stated that the executing Member State can only do so in 
exceptional circumstances, because of the importance of mutual trust. This ruling shows that mutual 
trust is not to be confused with blind trust. Even if this is the fact, the principle of mutual trust, after 
all, defines the whole EU legal structure. As such, any limitation to the principle of mutual trust 
may not give rise to mistrust between Member States, because that would lead to the fragmentation 
of the AFSJ. Limitations to the principle are to be such that they rather work by aiming to fix the 
trust in the future than aim to destroy it. This is the reason the Court decided to postpone the 
execution instead of denying it from the outset.
265
      
 
There are some questions on how this postponement operates. First, does the postponement apply to 
all fundamental rights? The answer is not straightforward. Before anything it is necessary to know if 
it applies to both EU and national standards of fundamental rights protection. The judgement 
reveals that the Court was more preoccupied with fundamental rights standards at EU level. Due to 
this the newly brought up ground for postponement is only relevant when EU standards of 
fundamental rights protection are in question and not those of the Member States. Following this, 
the relevant question can be raised: Does this exception cover other fundamental rights covered by 
the Charter or does it only apply to Article 4 of the Charter. In the judgement the Court seemed to 
indicate that the exception only applies to Article 4 of the Charter. Even then, national courts should 
be able to postpone the execution of the EAW if there is a real risk that other fundamental rights 
might be breached in the issuing Member State. Second question is about the burden of proof. On 
the matter of burden of proof, the Court was not very clear and the responsibility seems to be shared 
by the requested person, the executing authority and the issuing authority in the different stages of 
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the process. Then, the third question is about what happens when the executing authority decides to 
postpone the surrender? In such a case, according to the Court, Eurojust will be informed and as is 
decided in Lanigan, the requested person cannot be detained for too long. Yet it is only possible to 
postpone the execution, not abandon it. This could possibly mean that the ground of postponement 
could turn into ground of refusal if the conditions of detention in the issuing Member State cannot 
be changed in an allotted time.
266
   
 
There is a large difference between the conclusion given by the Court and what the Advocate 
General offered. The Court, in its decision, gave the executing judicial authority power to assess 
how fundamental rights are practiced in the issuing Member States and, in certain cases, defer 
surrender of the requested person. This is at odds with mutual trust that is based on the presumption 
that other Member States provide adequate fundamental rights protection. The Advocate General, 
on the other hand, in his opinion wanted to leave mutual trust intact and have the issuing judicial 
authority conduct a proportionality test. Overall, the Court decided to make mutual trust more 
nuanced as it had done before in its asylum case law and opted for an interpretation that would 
allow fundamental rights violations to constitute as an exception to this trust.
267
 
 
The question remains if the Court managed to create a proper balance in this case. There were three 
options the Court could choose from. First, the Court could have put fundamental rights higher on 
hierarchy than mutual trust and mutual recognition. This would mean that in cases where conflict 
exists between the various principles, fundamental rights prevail and the EAW would not be 
executed. This, however, would go against the Framework Decision on the EAW which does not 
include fundamental rights in its grounds of refusal. Second, the Court could have chosen to 
continue the way it had before in its case law and balance the two values, and still end up favoring 
the effectiveness of mutual recognition at the cost of fundamental rights of the individual. Third, 
instead of the aforementioned options the Court founds a balance between the two competing 
values. Firstly, the Court decided to protect the principle of mutual recognition and mutual trust by 
refraining from introducing a new ground of refusal into the text of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW. Instead of ground of refusal the Court came up with less drastic ground of postponement. 
Secondly, the Court ended up protecting fundamental rights of the defendants. ‗Systemic 
deficiencies‘ test was loosened and supplements for the test were created where it was considered if 
a real risk existed that the requested person´s rights under Article 4 of the EU charter would be 
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infringed.
268
        
 
The ground of postponing the decision on the execution of EAW was a need development in the 
search for balance between fundamental rights and the principles of mutual trust and mutual 
recognition. The Court seems to have found a way to protect the core of the EAW while still giving 
fundamental rights the value they should have. The fundamental rights protecting the requested 
person are bolstered. The executing authority is expected, as the Court stressed, to check if there 
truly is a risk for the requested person to end up being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment 
in the detention facilities of the issuing Member State. There are still questions that the case leaves 
unanswered, but this case is still a remarkable step.  
 
 
4.3.2.4 Case JZ 
 
 
In case JZ, the issue at hand was the interpretation of deprivation of liberty. As deprivation of 
liberty is of paramount importance in Framework Decision on the EAW, the case has a great impact 
on how the EAW mechanism is implemented.
269
 
 
The Court was preoccupied with the term detention as defined in Article 26 of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW. According to the aforementioned Article: ―The issuing Member State shall 
deduct all periods of detention arising from the execution of a European arrest warrant from the 
total period of detention to be served in the issuing Member State as a result of a custodial sentence 
or detention order being passed.‖270 
 
In the case JZ asked for reduction of sentence imposed on him by Poland, based on the time he 
spent under electronic monitoring by the executing Member State, United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland. The electronic monitoring was in conjunction with curfew. The question 
referring court asked, was if the concept of detention mentioned in Article 26 of the Framework 
Decision on the EAW covers measures used by the executing Member State. The measures used 
being electronic monitoring of the place where the individual whom the arrest warrant concerns 
lives, in conjunction with curfew, as mentioned before. Article 26 of the Framework Decision on the 
EAW was to be interpreted together with Articles 6 and 49 of CFREU. Within Articles 6 and 49 of 
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CFREU are defined liberty and the principle of proportionality.
271
 
 
The Court stated that deprivation of liberty does not necessarily need to constitute imprisonment. As 
such, imprisonment should not be the only thing taken into account, when considering what 
constitutes as detention. All the measures imposed on the person, which considering their type, 
duration, effect and manner of the implementation of the measures, deprive individual of liberty in a 
manner that is reminiscent to imprisonment, could be interpreted as ―detention‖ within the meaning 
of Article 26(1) of Framework Decision on the EAW.
272
    
 
The Court found that even if the measures JZ was subjected to were restricting his liberty, they 
could not be considered deprivation of liberty. This being said, in so far as Article 26(1) of the 
Framework Decision on the EAW is concerned, it only imposes ―a minimum level of protection of 
the fundamental rights of the person subject to the European arrest warrant‖. An interpretation, that 
would prevent the judicial authority of the Member State that issued the arrest warrant from being 
able to reduce, on the basis of domestic law, the time the individual had his liberty restrained from 
the sentence, is not something that can be done.
273
 
 
 
4.3.2.5 Case Dworzecki 
 
 
Dworzecki case was about an important piece of the Framework Decision on the EAW, the indirect 
summons. The question was about the interpretation of the term. Preliminary ruling was mostly 
concerned about the interpretation of the Article 4a(1)(a)(i), which was added to the Framework 
Decision on the EAW by Framework Decision 2009/299. This provision concerns cases where the 
execution of an EAW cannot be refused when issued after a trial in absentia. ―That is so when, inter 
alia, the person in due time, and in accordance with further procedural requirements defined in the 
law of the issuing state: was summoned in person and thereby informed of the scheduled date and 
place of the trial; or, by other means, actually received official information of the scheduled date 
and place of that trial in such a manner that it was unequivocally established that s/he was aware of 
the trial.‖274 
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In case of Dworzecki, the summons was not given to the person concerned, not directly anyway. 
The summons was given to an adult who resided in the same address as Mr Dworzecki. This adult 
took it upon him- or herself to pass the summons. It is impossible to determine from the EAW if, 
and when, the summons was actually passed on to Mr Dworzecki.
275
 
 
The question firstly posed before the Court was if the following expressions constitute autonomous 
concepts of EU law and must be interpreted uniformly throughout European Union: ―Summoned in 
person‖ and ―by other means actually received official information of the scheduled date and place 
of that trial in such a manner that it was unequivocally established that he or she was aware of the 
scheduled trial‖. The Court held that this, indeed, was the case.276 
 
The Court concluded that the objective of the provision was to ensure a high level of individual 
protection. This was done by balancing respect of the rights of defence of the individual concerned 
and the need to execute the EAW.
277
 
 
The Court, once again, brought up that the right for the individual to appear on trial is not absolute. 
This right can be waived. This being said, the individual has to have the possibility of preparing his 
or her defence. The conditions provided for in Article 4a(1)(a)(i) were not satisfied in this case 
concerning Mr Dworzecki, according to the Court. This being so, even when the Court 
acknowledged that Framework Decision 2009/299 is not meant to have harmonizing effect on 
national legislation on the subject matter.
278
   
 
 
4.3.2.6 Case Bob-Dogi 
 
 
The Bob-Dogi case was about the interpretation of Article 8(1)(c). In this provision it is stated that 
the EAW must have some information that relates to evidence of enforceable judgement, an arrest 
warrant or any other enforceable judicial decision having the same effect.
279
 
 
The Court was posed a question if the arrest warrant mentioned in Article 8(1)(c) referred to a 
national arrest warrant. The Court stated that everywhere in the Framework Decision ―European 
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Arrest Warrant‖ is used with the exception of Article 8(1)(c), which would indicate it means another 
arrest warrant, other than EAW. The Court argued that it would be more consistent with 
fundamental rights protection, if a prior judicial decision is required.
280
       
 
When the EAW does not state if there is a national arrest warrant, the executing judge must, in 
accordance with Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision on the EAW, request that the issuing 
judge supplies all necessary information to supplement the EAW. If the executing judge deems that 
the EAW has been issued without a prior national warrant, that judge is required to consider the 
warrant not valid and refuse to give it effect.
281
 
 
 
4.3.2.7 Case LM 
 
 
The fundamental rights questions are being posed to the Court to the point of them bringing 
pressure. The principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust are tested. LM is one of the latest of 
these cases. 
 
The issue concerned in the case was whether LM, a crime suspect, was to be surrendered from 
Ireland to Poland when there was serious doubts on the side of executing judicial authority that the 
suspect might not receive a fair trial in the issuing State. The doubts arose from the lack of 
independence of the judiciary which was a result of changes to the Polish judicial system. 
 
The set of laws that was adopted 2015-2018 in Poland has been considered commonly by many 
external and internal institutions as something that does ―enable the legislative and executive 
powers to interfere in a severe and extensive manner in the administration of justice, and thereby 
pose a grave threat to the judicial independence as a key element of the law‖.282   
 
This case comes after and is in the same vein as the Aranyosi and Căldăraru case. The case 
questions mutual trust between Member States, upon which the procedures concerning surrender in 
the Framework Decision on the EAW are based. The Aranyosi and Căldăraru case first set the 
exceptions for surrender on grounds of human rights. In LM the legal issue was about if and to what 
extent Aranyosi and Căldăraru case should be followed.   
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The LM case, in more detail, was about a man who was accused of drug trafficking and who had 
fled to Ireland. The Polish Court issued an EAW for Mr LM in order to conduct a criminal 
prosecution. The Irish High Court, which pondered the surrender of Mr LM to Poland, was not 
certain of the ability of the Polish courts to ensure fair trial. The Irish High Court relied mostly on 
Commissions´s reasoned proposal, which was submitted to the Council under Article 7(1) TEU, to 
try and state an indubitable risk of a serious breach on Polands part when it came to the rule of 
law.
283
 
 
The Irish High Court made a preliminary reference to the Court in which it asked, if an issuing 
Member State can be refused by the executing Member State from executing the EAW in case there 
is evidence of systemic breaches to judicial independence.
284
 The Court decided to hold on to its 
approach brought about in an earlier decision Aranyosi and Căldăraru. This approach aimed at 
limiting any exceptions to principles of mutual recognition and mutual trust. Also, the Court said 
that the individual situation of the person who is sought after by the EAW should be considered. It 
should be considered if he or she is running a risk of undergoing an unfair trial in the issuing 
Member State.
285
 
 
Some observers were hoping that the Court would go forth and assess the state of judicial 
independence in Poland. An argument was that the Court should go beyond case law and perceive 
the case as a problem of rule of law. The judicial operators should have independent responsibility 
to stop the surrender proceedings if it would violate the rights of the wanted person due to there 
being a lack of judicial independence in the issuing state. Also, the balancing of different EU 
constitutional principles bringing forth political pressure should be handled by democratically 
elected institutions. Judicial cooperation should be stopped by the executing judicial authorities in 
case doubt arises concerning the rule of law in the issuing Member State. The measure should be 
held in place until the matter is handled according to the procedure set out in Article 7 TEU or the 
DFR pact initiated by the European Parliament.
286
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In his opinion AG Tanchev stated that in case Article 47 of the Charter is breached, it could justify 
the postponement of surrender. This was only possible in case of flagrant denial of justice.
287
 The 
Court, following the overall lines of the aforementioned opinion, stated that a breach of judicial 
independence was something that could authorise an exception to the execution of an EAW. The 
Court, however, did not agree with the term ―flagrant denial of justice‖. Instead they opted for the 
term ―a real risk of breach‖.288 The proposal of the AG has had some criticism levied towards it for 
imposing an impossibly high burden of proof on the applicant. It has also been criticised for wholly 
ignoring the idea of mutual trust in a high level protection of fundamental rights within EU.
289
 
 
The Court decided not to assess the judicial independence in Poland. Also, it bypassed the 
assessment that was proposed by the referring judge. In this assessment the referring judge stated 
that the legislative changes made in Poland have been so damaging to the rule of law that there has 
been a breach of common value of the rule of law in Poland. The assessments brought up in the 
questions of the referring judge were not reformulated by the Court. The court simply affirmed that 
an adequate test with which to identify unfair trials should be two-pronged. First, the executing 
courts should be able to find systemic and generalised deficiencies liable to affect the judiciary in 
the issuing Member State. The standards that are derived from Article 47 of the Charter bind the 
executing Courts.
290
 Secondly, the executing court must make an assessment of whether there are 
substantial grounds to believe that the individual concerned faces the risk of an unfair trial in the 
issuing Member State.
291
 
 
The Court found highly relevant if the deficiencies in the system affected those courts that had the 
jurisdiction over the requested individual´s case, after he or she was surrendered. To make sure the 
individualised risk existed, the court should ask for ―supplementary information‖ or any ―objective 
material‖ from the issuing court under Article 15(2) of the Framework Decision.292 
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The referring judge asked what kind of ―supplementary information‖ or any ―objective material‖ 
was viable. The court did not give a specific answer to this question. Also, the referring judge 
indicated, that in this case, concerning Poland, the legal regime that is thought to be controversial 
applied to all rank-and-file judges, thus rendering the concrete prong redundant.
293
       
 
One remarkable aspect is how the Court decided to uphold the concrete prong. From the Court´s 
reasoning it can be seen that the preservation of mutual recognition is valued highly. Also, the Court 
drew a line between its own competence and the competence of the European Council. The 
interpretation suggested by AG Tanchev to juxtapose Articles 7(2) TEU, 19(1) TEU and 47 of the 
Charter seem to have been followed by the Court. The AG, in his opinion, stated that the Court was 
responsible for fair trials in individual cases and the European Council on the other hand handled 
the domestic judicial systems with the rule of law.
294
 The burden this imposes on domestic courts 
will be looked at at the next chapter. 
 
 
4.4 Burdens of domestic courts 
 
 
Domestic courts are required to find a balance between the EAW and its effectiveness and the 
protection of fundamental rights. Principle of mutual recognition requires automaticity which is 
restrained by the protection of individual´s fundamental rights.
295
     
 
Next, I will go through three scenarios that are defined by the alleged breach of fundamental rights. 
I will mostly concentrate on the third, which concentrates on the potential violation of the 
fundamental right or rights by the authorities in issuing Member State. 
 
First, a problem arises when an EAW is deemed to contain a breach of fundamental rights. This will 
question whether the EAW is valid or not. This validity can only be assessed by referring to the 
Charter, as ECHR and national constitutions do not count as direct parameters when checking  
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whether EU law is valid or not. To validate the incompatibility of the Framework Decision with 
fundamental rights with, the domestic courts need to make a preliminary reference to the Court. 
Only in few cases, such as Advocaten and Melloni, has the validity of the Framework Decision been 
directly challenged. The preliminary reference is a good way to have judicial dialogue between the 
constitutional courts and Court.
296
 
 
Secondly, a breach of fundamental rights might come to light in the legislation implementing the 
Framework Decision in the Member State. The important factor is, how much there exists margin 
for implementation. Domestic courts that are in charge of executing the EAW could doubt how 
compatible the implementing legislation is with fundamental rights that are enshrined in the 
Constitution, the Charter or the Convention. If this is the case, in order to continue, the Court should 
take into account how wide of a margin is left to the States and the potential divergence in the 
interpretation of the fundamental rights that are applicable within the framework of the respective 
system for the judicial review of legislation. If there is no discretion left for domestic authorities, 
and the statute that is implemented reproduces the same terms and wording of the Framework 
Decision, then the point of interest of review should be Framework Decision through preliminary 
reference to the Court. If there is margin for discretion, then the possible breach of Constitutional or 
Charter rights can be resolved directly by domestic courts.
297
   
 
Thirdly, there are situations where the breach of fundamental rights might happen in midst of 
process when executing or issuing an EAW. These infringements on fundamental rights could be 
done by the authorities of issuing or executing Member State. The most complex situations 
considering EAW arise when the possible infringements on fundamental rights have occurred in the 
process before the EAW was issued, or when the infringement might happen as a result of surrender 
of the requested individual to another Member State. And herein lies the problem. To what extent 
are the domestic courts allowed to condemn the issuing authorities for not complying with the 
fundamental rights, and thereby refuse the execution of an EAW?
298
 
 
To better grasp the problem posed before the domestic courts, it is better to return to the case LM 
due to its recency and importance. 
 
The Court, in case LM, stated that the national court is responsible of determining whether to 
execute an EAW or not even if Article 7 procedure is pending. The decision to refuse to execute an 
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EAW must follow the two-step test introduced in  Aranyosi and Căldăraru.299 
 
In the first step, the executing court has to look at reliable, specific and properly updated material 
relating to how the justice system in the issuing Member State operates. Then, the executing court 
has to determine if there is a real risk of breach of the fair trial rights of the person who is 
concerned, also the potential lack of independence of the courts must be looked at.
300
 As for he 
judicial independence, the Court relied heavily on the case Associação Sindical dos Juízes 
Portugueses and stated that impartiality and judicial independence are paramount for the right to a 
fair trial.
301
 
 
If the first step of the test is satisfactory, then the executing judiciary has to properly assess if there 
are substantial grounds to think that the requested individual will run a real risk of being a subject to 
a breach of the right to a fair trial.
302
 
 
The national court, the Irish High Court, on November 2018 gave its final decision. An appeal was 
made before the Supreme Court that held the decision of the High Court. The decision of the High 
Court was: ―This Court has been concerned only with whether the relevant threshold preventing 
surrender has been reached, in accordance with the principles laid down by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union. That threshold, which is a high one under the law of extradition/surrender, has 
not been reached on the evidence before this Court.‖303 
 
As for the application test, the High Court stated that an individualized assessment must be done. 
And for the breach of a fair trial rights to be violated, other aspects of the right to a fair trial must be 
at risk at being violated, even if in very particular situations the lack of independence and 
impartiality might amount to a breach of a fair trial rights. The assessment then continues and is 
mostly concerned with the Deputy Minister of Justice who claimed the requested person was a 
dangerous criminal when it came to the requested person´s presumption of innocence. However, 
those comments were not seen as significant when it came to determining whether the responder is 
the one who committed those acts or not.
304
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There are risks in the approach the Court has taken. The Court´s idea that the EAW procedures as a 
whole can only be suspended by completing the procedures in the Article 7(2) and 7(3) vis-à-vis the 
issuing Member State might result  in placing too much burden on national courts. If these national 
courts are unable to take on that responsibility, it will result in impunity of Member States violating 
the rule of law, and also the proliferation of violations of rights of individuals. Also, the test brought 
about in Aranyosi and Căldăraru could be applied by some judicial authorities, but not by others, 
thus leading to fragmented EU law and discrimination of EU citizens.
305
 Only time will truly tell, 
and it is possible the result of this case is a one step forward two step backwards situation.    
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
 
Judicial assistance, traditional cooperation, has traditionally been governed by international 
instruments between sovereign states. From the 1950s, from when the multilateral agreements 
organized by the Council of Europe concerning criminal matters were prevalent in many forms of 
cooperation in criminal matters, we have come to this day. 
 
The cooperation in criminal matters has become a long way. Mutual recognition is not a new 
concept and it is not only applicable to EU law. But mutual recognition in criminal law is quite 
different from the other forms of mutual recognition. Also, it is quite hard to try and differentiate 
mutual recognition from the goals of AFSJ and harmonization. Especially with ASFJ there are some 
tensions that affect the success of the EAW. The problems that arise are many and nuanced. The 
terms and what AFSJ represents bring about problems. Mutual trust, as seen in this thesis, is to 
some extent under duress. 
 
Mutual recognition in itself is a form of cooperation which demands that the standards of another 
Member State are accepted within the limiting factor of predefined instruments. This can lead to a 
situation where the lowest common denominator is the norm. This is combatted with increasing 
mutual trust and having human right preconditions.
306
 Also, this obligation to accept the standards 
of another Member State is not absolute and can in certain situations be refused. In this light the 
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mechanisms made for mutual recognition, EAW being one of them, have been effective tools to 
allow the principle of mutual recognition to flourish. The EAW has been the flagship to usher the 
principle of mutual recognition forward as it requires a wide array of recognition for arrest warrants. 
 
As a whole the EAW is progress compared to what was. The line between judicial authorities in 
different Member States and suppressing political hurdles have been a key factor as far as 
minimizing the formalities goes. But the EAW was maybe pushed out too fast. Most problems seem 
to have a relation to the fundamental rights and the issue with defence of a requested individual 
suffering from the effectiveness of the EAW. Instead of the hasty process, with which terrorism and 
organized crime was meant to be fought, used to concoct the EAW, more things like EU 
constitutional law and criminal law should have been taken into account. 
 
In criminal cooperation there are principles concerning extradition that should have been taken into 
account more when making the EAW. Principles like nationality, speciality rule and dual criminality 
should have been accompanied with human rights elements. 
 
The national courts are bearing the burden of mutual recognition in many ways. The principle of 
mutual recognition cannot be the only factor in criminal matters and there should be more 
harmonization so that the legal systems of Member States become more approachable to national 
courts, and in a wider sense more recognizable altogether. One of the more striking issues is how 
different the penalties and offences are in different Member States. 
 
The national courts, when thinking if they should execute the EAW, are assumed to do so case by 
case basis. This will affect them by increasing their workload. The two-step test brought about by 
the decision in Aranyosi and Căldăraru is somewhat burdensome to national courts. 
 
The non-execution, in my opinion, should be perceived as a serious threat and the EU should be 
looking to identify the core of the problems and find solutions. A reasoned set of limits when it 
comes to rule of should be a priority to the EU. Also what happens when you cross the set limit 
should be defined. Maybe these should have been already set in Aranyosi and Căldăraru, but I am 
hopeful for the future decisions. Case LM can be seen as an important milestone when it comes to 
the protection of fundamental rights in light of the effectivity of mutual recognition. 
 
All in all mutual trust is necessary in order to EAW actually work. The principle of mutual trust, 
sadly, is still somewhat shaky due to the differences in legal systems and criminal proceedings of 
75 
Member States. In some Member States the protection of fundamental rights is seemingly not at the 
required level. Thus, the EAW being automatic will do more harm than good and affect mutual trust 
poorly. Even if the non-execution of the EAW in some cases might in the short run seem like it is an 
affront to the principle of mutual trust, in the end it could quite possibly end up forging a stronger 
bond of mutual trust by ensuring high level of protection.                   
